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ABSTRACT PAGE
This thesis intends to challenge conventional historical understandings of the political leadership 
of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania by placing them in comparison, 
specifically in the key early post-independence period of 1960-1979. It examines points of 
convergence and contrast in their rises to power, their methods of leadership, and their 
ideological and pragmatic modes of executing the power of the state. It also demonstrates how 
the contexts from which each man emerged, both personally and within the nation, played a 
crucial role in their respective ascensions to power and subsequent leadership played out, and, 
by proxy, how the trajectories of each nation were set in place by these processes.
The thesis focuses on the period from 1960-1979 preceded by introductory biographical sketches 
of each man. The first section of this thesis briefly contextualizes the national and personal 
histories which are at the center of the project. The second section focuses on deployments of 
language in each nationalization project. The third section addresses the construction and 
implementation of ideologically important documents in each context. The final section analyses 
Mobutu and Nyerere's respective relationships with the U.S. government during the early stages 
of the Angolan conflict.
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Introduction
I saw that old Father Nile without any doubt rises in the Victoria N'yanza, and, as 
I had foretold, that lake is the great source of the Holy River which cradled the 
first expounder of our religious belief.
—John Hanning Speke1
Passing thence to the south ... Cao become soon aware that he was approaching a 
large river, for when still 5 leagues out at sea... he found the water fresh, by no 
means an exaggeration, for islands of floating vegetation coining out of the Congo 
have been encountered 100 miles from its mouth, and 9 miles to seaward the 
surface water is quite fresh.
. 2
— Ernest George Ravenstein
Maji huteremka bondeni,hayapandi mlima.
Water must flow into the low places, for it cannot climb up the hill.
As it bisects the African continent the equator crosses two of the world's great 
bodies of water: the Congo River and Lake Victoria. These waters have long sustained 
the lives of millions of Africans, and captured the fancy of the first European explorers to 
encounter them—people like Diogo Cao, Henry Morton Stanley and John Speke. Artists 
from the author Joseph Conrad to filmmaker John Huston have found inspiration in these 
bodies of water.4 The Congo River is one of the most powerful rivers on the planet, 
pulling water from countless tributaries that drain the immense Congo rainforest basin. 
Over 900 miles upriver from where the river disgorges itself violently into the Atlantic
1 John Hanning Speke, Journal o f  the discovery o f  the source o f  the Nile, (London: J.M. Dent &, 1908), 
429.
2 Ernest George Ravenstein, The voyages o f  Diogo Cao and Bartholomeu Dias: 1482 - 88 (London: Royal 
Geographic Society, 1908), 5.
3 A Swahili methali, or proverb, translated by the author. As with many Swahili proverbs this methali 
contains shared wisdom, and the origin of it lies in oral tradition, thus the “original” author is unknown.
4 Huston's "The African Queen" was filmed on location on the Congo River in 1951.
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lies a small town called Lisala.5 Still a sleepy backwater, Lisala's most famous product is 
Mobutu Sese Seko, bom Joseph-Desiree Mobutu in 1930. Lake Victoria, the source of 
Nile and thus one of the most important transnational natural resources in the world, is 
also the largest tropical lake on the planet.6 On its southeastern bank lies the small 
community of Butiama, also famous for its own native son, Julius Nyerere, born 
Kambarage Nyerere in 1922.
Like many others on the continent both Mobutu and Nyerere had a connection to 
the waters of Africa beyond just physical sustenance. Nyerere’s mother was renowned for 
her spiritual power to help summon the rains, and named Nyerere after a spirit of 
lightning which she said presided over his birth—a night pervaded by a furious 
thunderstorm.7 Mobutu possessed a “visceral love of the water” his entire life, and 
routinely built homes on the banks of great bodies of water.8 In contrast to the power of 
these waters were the men’s inauspicious home towns, each beside these marvels of 
nature. Each came from families without colonial connections, and from ethnic groups on 
the margins of national society without any significant political power base to mobilize, 
and yet these men emerged from these beginnings to dominate the politics of east and
5 It is now known that the Congo is the second most voluminous river, after the Amazon, on the planet. 
However, even at the time o f its European “discovery” by Diogo Cao, the explorer was stunned to find 
detritus from the river ejected several miles into the Atlantic. According to the Smithsonian Magazine (see 
full citation in the conclusion) the Congo flows at “ 1.25 million cubic feet o f water per second.”
6 F. Witte et al., "Species extinction and concomitant ecological changes in Lake Victoria," Netherlands 
Journal o f  Zoology 42, no. 2-3 (1991): 214.
7 Shirley Graham Du Bois, Julius K. Nyerere: Teacher o f  Africa (New York: Julian Messner, 1975), 17.
8 Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps o f  Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink o f  Disaster in Mobutu's Congo (New 
York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 71. Even his homes in Europe tended to be built near water, such as his 
villa on the French Riviera.
2
central Africa for more than three decades. Today, the Congo River and Lake Victoria 
bear witness to the multiple legacies left Nyerere and Mobutu on Tanzania and the DRC.9
The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania emerged from the colonial 
period with two markedly different national contexts.10 Tanzania’s bloodless 
independence struggle produced one clear choice for head of state: Julius Nyerere, 
moving into independence at the head of his highly mobilized, multi-ethnic Tanganyikan 
Africa National Union party. Educated in Scotland and Uganda11, brilliant, philosophical 
and calm, Nyerere’s rise to national leadership was predetermined with colonial officials
and peaceful, but would not have been possible without sustained political pressure and
1 2grassroots organization on the part of the Tanzanian populace.
By contrast, the abrupt Belgian withdrawal from the Congo was marked by 
violence and chaos, and a severe lack of premeditation. Only 26 Congolese in a 
population of over thirty million had completed post-secondary education by
1 'Xindependence in 1960. Ethnically aligned political leaders like Joseph Kasa-Vubu and 
Moise Tshombe vied for control of the nation during the Congo Crisis of 1960-61, and 
the elected president, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated within his first year in office.
9 For the sake o f coherence, 1 will use the term “Congo” for the state called variously the Congo Free State 
from 1885, the Belgian Congo in 1908, the Democratic Republic o f the Congo in 1960, Zaire in 1967, and 
then again in 2007, the Democratic Republic o f the Congo. “Tanzania” will be used instead o f Tangayika, 
except where the distinction is relevant to provide context.
10 Zaire in 1960 and Tanzania in 1963.
11 At Makerere University in Kampala and the University of Edinburgh.
12 For example see 1. N. Kimambo and A. J. Temu, A History o f  Tanzania (Nairobi: East African 
Publishing House, 1969), 209. Nyerere's push to the U.N. for independence formally began in 1955 through 
a direct appeal to end trusteeship and place power in the hands of indigenous political groups.
13 Barbara A. Yates, "Structural Problems in Education in the Congo (Leopoldville),"Comparative 
Education Review  7, no. 2 (October 1963): 159.
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Foreign powers, especially the United Nations, United States, and the Soviet Union, in 
the fervor of the Cold War, attempted to control Congolese proxies who in turn attempted 
to manipulate their supposed puppeteers. Out of this maelstrom emerged an unlikely 
leader: a man who had not completed secondary school, achieved power through 
establishing client networks within the military, and had no major ethnic base to 
consolidate his leadership. In light of these political challenges, Joseph-Desiree Mobutu, 
despite intense support from the United States, seemed destined to be, within a short 
time, another victim of Congo’s exceptionally bloody political history. This, of course, 
would not be so. Thirty years later both men were still major forces in their respective 
nation’s politics, but were in the twilight of their influence.14 Their legacies today, 
however, are as divergent as were the conditions of their emergence into national 
leadership. Julius Nyerere’s beatification to sainthood in the Catholic Church and 
informal veneration by Tanzanians and others around the world is ongoing.15 By 
contrast, many still vilify Mobutu, blaming him in part for the world’s deadliest conflict 
since World War II which continues in the Congo, ignited in the wake of his violent fall 
from power.16
These preponderant perspectives are not universal. Ali Mazrui famously critiqued 
what he called a “Tanzaphilia” among western Africanists, eager to see the very best in 
Nyerere’s ideals and implementations because of Nyerere’s intellectual ability, his pan-
14 Nyerere stepped down from the presidency in J 985, but remained chairman o f the party in power, Chama 
Cha Mapinduzi, until 1990.
1'"'Robert Mugagga, "Yes, Nyerere Could Make a Great Saint!" The Observer (Kampala), October 29, 2009.
16 Brennan, Richard. Mortality in the Democratic Republic o f  Congo. Report. New York: International 
Rescue Committee, 2008.
4
Africanism, and his moderate leftism.17 Mobutu, also, has been written off too often in 
academic critique, and many scholars have allowed the kleptocratic aspect of his regime 
to overshadow any possible ideological contributions made by his regime to Zairian
. . 1 ft ^consciousness and regional politics. Despite this, scholars such as Crawford Young and 
Thomas Turner suggest that Mobutu’s idea of “authenticite,” initially at least, was an 
effective, popular, and ideologically interesting political construct, with “genuine 
resonance” and power.19 Indeed, the common wisdom that Mobutu was a puppet for 
American interests in Africa is also due for challenge. An ex-U.S. ambassador to Zaire, 
for example, recognized that Mobutu was “an extraordinary political animal” and 
ultimately admitted that Mobutu had far more influence and power in the bilateral 
relationship than the United States.20
A reason for these complex views of each man is that they can be seen to 
represent a category of Africa's first generation of independent leaders. Nyerere is 
prototypical of what Toyin Falola calls a “small elite of political theorists who doubled as 
political leaders.” These were well educated, ideologically committed
statesmen/intellectuals—men like Ghana’s Kwame Nkurumah, Zambia’s Kenneth
2 1Kaunda and Senegal’s Leopold Senghor. Mobutu represents leaders who acquired
17 Ali A. Mazrui, "Tanzaphilia," Transition 75/76 (1997).
18 Examples include In the Footsteps o f  Mr. Kurtz by journalist Michela Wrong, cited frequently in this 
book, C hief O f Station, Congo by former CIA station chief Larry Devlin, and Mobutu or Chaos by Michael 
G. Schatzberg.
19 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline o f  the Zairian State (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1985), 220.
20 Elise F. Patcher, "Our Man in Kinshasa: U.S. relations with Mobutu, 1970-1983; Patron-Client relations 
in the international sphere " (diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1987), 321. The ambassador is not named in 
Patcher's dissertation, and the quotation is attributed to "Informant 32."
21 Toyin Falola, Nationalism and African Intellectuals (Rochester, N.Y.: University o f Rochester Press, 
2000), 27. Falola also includes “Ndamdi Azikiwe o f Nigeria, Jomo Kenyatta o f Kenya... Sekou Toure of
5
power through control of the military, autocrats who ruled through repression and left 
power in disgrace through violence. Sadly, Mobutu-like leaders are plentiful in modem 
African history, including men like C.A.R.’s Jean-Bedel Bokassa, Somalia’s Siad Barre, 
and Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam.22 This thesis intends to challenge these macro­
categories of African leadership through placing Mobutu and Nyerere in comparison, 
specifically in the key period of 1960-1979. This project does not intend to elevate 
Mobutu, or denigrate Nyerere, but rather intends to examine points of convergence and 
contrast in their rises to power, their methods of leadership, and their ideological and 
pragmatic modes of executing the power of the state. Finally, this thesis intends to 
demonstrate how the contexts from which each man emerged, both personally and within 
the nation, played a crucial role in how each man's rise to power and subsequent 
leadership played out, and, by proxy, how the trajectories of each nation were set in place 
by these processes.
Comparing these particular leaders also proves valuable because their states’ 
affairs have long been entangled geographically, politically and in terms of the 
trajectories of leadership. The nations share physical proximity— Lake Tanganyika is a 
common border. 23 The historical timelines of Mobutu and Nyerere's lives and periods of
Guinea, and Felix Houphouet-Boigny o f Cote d ’Ivoire” in this group. O f these, Sekou Toure certainly 
could have a place on the list included above, but his predilection for secret prisons and reports o f many 
hundreds murdered during his time in power cloud his worthiness on a list o f A frica’s most auspicious 
statesmen.
22 It is worth noting how closely these men adhere to the “Mobutu pattern.” Bokassa, Barre and Mariam all
entered the military as low level officers, seized power during chaos generated by a power vacuum, 
consolidated power under one party, and eventually were forced out of power through military action after 
overseeing brutally repressive regimes for many years. Mengistu has also been connected to Nyerere 
because o f his forced villigization process intended to nationalize farming, but the level o f oppression and 
repression he utilized in this process dwarfs any used in N yerere’s Tanzania.
2j The Lake Tanganyika border is almost three hundred miles long, and at its most narrow points is under
25 miles wide.
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power are remarkably similar. Each rose to power in the early days of African 
independence, and solidified their power and national boundaries from 1960-1963. Each 
spent three years consolidating power internally, from 1964-1966, and then crafted 
defining documents regarding the course of each nation in 1967. Each saw their nations 
and national visions largely thrive until key points in the mid-70s when several factors, 
both internal and external, set each nation on a downward trajectory in terms of economic 
development, political freedom, and cultural expansion. This scope, from 1960-1979, is 
the period examined in this thesis, with introductory biographical sketches of each man. 
The first section of this thesis briefly contextualizes the national and personal histories 
which are at the center of the project. The second section focuses on the use of language 
in each nationalization project. The third section addresses the construction and 
implementation of ideologically important documents in each context. The final section 
analyses Mobutu and Nyerere's respective relationships with the U.S. government during 
the early stages of the Angolan conflict, which saw a post-colonization Angola serve as 
proxy hot war between Cubans and Soviets against the United States and continental 
allies. 24
24 The Angolan Civil War begin in 1975 after it gained independence from Portugal and continued until the 
death of U NITA’s Jonas Savimbi in 2002.
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Part I. Establishing Context 
In order to effectively contextualize the comparison at the center of this thesis, it 
is important to briefly examine the development of the states of Congo and Tanzania, and 
then to sketch out the biographical details of each leader up to 1960, the beginning of the 
period examined more closely in the rest of the paper. The states that are now Tanzania 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo share the same infamous birth year: 1885.
This was the penultimate year of the Conference of Berlin, where the European powers 
arbitrarily parceled out Africa for economic exploitation, political experimentation, and
25resource extraction. To the residents of these newly minted nations, little would change 
for over a decade, and even then a new history of resistance and proto-independence 
would emerge, but in the imaginations of the cartographers of Europe the African 
continent was to be forever transformed.
Colonial Congo
King Leopold II of Belgium had been laying groundwork for the acquisition of the Congo
26Free State since at least 1876, almost a decade prior to the Conference of Berlin. 
Leopold’s audacious plan was to gain for himself personally—not as the titular head of 
the state of Belgium— an economically bountiful region almost seventy seven times the
2 7size of his own nation. Leopold recognized in the Congo the potential for massive 
mineral extraction, agriculture, and saw in its mass a space for a tiny nation to engage in 
large projects, impossible in the metropole. He also knew that Belgium needed to take its
2:1 Thomas Packenhanrs The Scramble for Africa  is an excellent account o f this process.
26 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People's History (London: Zed 
Books, 2002), 15.
27 Belgium is just under 1 1,800 square miles and Congo is over 905,000 square miles.
place in Africa for reasons of prestige and influence, the colonization of Africa quickly 
became a status project as well as brimming with economic potential. He knew from the 
outset that he needed strong public support in from the Belgian people, international 
humanitarian groups and other national powers, especially Britain, France and Germany, 
for his African project. One method he used to generate this was by enlisting the famous 
explorer, Henry Morton Stanley, to chart the area around the Congo River and extract 
treaties from chiefs in the region. At the Conference of Berlin, Leopold’s near decade of 
intense politicking paid off, and using Stanley's reports and treaties as evidence of the 
righteousness of his claims he was granted by the conference delegates a massive land
grant— the size of Western Europe— in Africa as a “humanitarian venture” under his
28supervision. The outcomes of this “humanitarian venture” are well known, revealed 
especially powerfully by journalist Adam Hochshild in King Leopold’s Ghost. Despite 
his success in convincing the world to adopt his plan for Central Africa, the economic 
viability of the Free State was by no means a foregone conclusion. However, rubber, 
newly adapted for commercial use, proved the engine of financial gain which justified 
economically Leopold’s massive gamble, but the extraction of the sap from the rubber 
vine cryptostegia grandiflora proved highly deadly to the people of the “Free State,”
29events described well by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja as "the Congo holocaust." After 
Leopold’s 23 year period of rule, Congo lost approximately half of its population to the 
unimaginable utilizations of violence under the Force Publique,— Leopold’s military
"’8 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 16.
29 Ibid., 18.
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force— disease and massive displacement.30 The grotesque violence achieved its 
economic purpose, however: estimates suggest Leopold extracted approximately $1.1
31billion of raw materials, adjusted for inflation, during his reign over the Free State.
Activists like E. D. Morel and George Washington Williams, missionaries like 
William Sheppard, and authors like Joseph Conrad and Mark Twain brought the 
atrocities being committed in Congo to world attention, and in 1908 Leopold lost control 
of the Congo to the state of Belgium.32 The Belgian government itself did not pressure 
Leopold to relinquish the state—he always imagined "grandly bequeathing" Congo to his 
people—but he did not wish for the transfer of power to be impelled by humiliation and 
international condemnation.33 This time, however, Leopold did not get his wish.
Belgium reluctantly took control of the state, having nothing like the economic 
capacity of Britain to fund the expenses of colonial experimentation. For this reason, the 
Belgian government maintained the system of exploitive and regressive governance 
Leopold had established, albeit with the whitewash of a “constitution” overseeing 
political practices.34 They also followed in the trajectory of their monarch by brutally 
exploiting the region for Belgian economic benefit while expending the bare minimum 
effort on humanitarian or “civilizing” projects. Thus, by the time domestic pressure from
30 Ibid., 22. The 1911 census recorded 8.5 million Congolese, and the estimates taken by Leopold when he 
came into possession o f the Free State indicated between 20 and 30 million people.
31 Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost a Story o f  Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial 
H//7cr/(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 277.
32 Conrad’s book is the famous Heart o/D arkness, and Tw ain’s book on the subject was King Leopold’s 
Soliloquy.
33 Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost, 257.
34 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 27.
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Congolese dissidents, and the rising tide of African independence movements across the 
continent, overcame the rickety Belgian colonial apparatus, what was handed over to the 
Congolese was, in the words of Patrice Lumumba, “a regime of injustice, suppression and 
exploitation.”35
Colonial Tanzania
In 1885 when European powers granted Leopold the right to attempt to conquer 
the area that became the Congo Free State, the fourteen-year-old nation of Germany 
received a number of African territories as well, including what was called Tanganyika 
and the state of Ruanda-Urundi combined into a region called German East Africa. The 
German Empire's Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s reasons for acquiring holdings in East 
Africa have been characterized by John Iliffe as “obscure.”36 Bismarck appeared to think 
it would be “very simple” to gain territory in East Africa: “for a few muskets one can 
obtain a paper with some native crosses,” he observed.37 This proved to be anything but 
the case, and widespread rebellions, most notably the Maji-Maji rebellion in 1905, 
shattered German expectations of ruling a simple, docile populace in East Africa. The 
Germans were never able to ignite rapid economic growth in Tanganyika, and gold 
mining, later a major component of the Tanzanian economy, did not begin until 1909. 
Likewise, the Gennans were not able to consolidate enough labor to make any large scale 
industry viable due to Tanzania's relatively low population density.
3:1 As quoted in Sean Kelly, America's Tyrant (Lanham, Md.: American University Press, 1993), 16.
36 John Iliffe, A Modern History o f  Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 89.
37 Quoted in Iliffe, A Modern History o f  Tanganyika, 90.
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In the aftermath of World War I, and Bismarck’s loss to the allies, the League of 
Nations designated colonies formerly held by the Germans as "trustee" territories which 
would be administered by various Allied states. Tanganyika fell into the "trusteeship" of
oo
the United Kingdom. Unlike Congo under Leopold, Tanganyika had not been a highly 
successful economic project for the Germans. Neither country possessed large scale 
agricultural projects, and Tanganyika had nothing like the nascent copper mining
3 9operation in the Katanga region of the Belgian Congo when the British took control.
The very low population density— and the subsequent inability of German colonialists to 
generate a large enough labor pool to develop massive agriculture, in this case sisal 
farms— dramatically inhibited their ability to profit from their colonial dealings in 
Tanganyika.40 The British had already invested very heavily in Kenya to the North, and 
thus were not prepared to invest the money necessary to convert Tanzania into the high- 
producing agrarian colony they were developing in Kenya, despite relatively similar 
geography. In some key respects, such as offering aid to encourage migration of 
European settlers to the region, Britain invested even less in Tanganyika, and even in 
their capstone colony of Kenya, than the Gennans had.41
38 Elliot Green, "The Political Economy o f Nation Formation in M odem  Tanzania," in Proceedings o f  the 
Annual Meeting o f  the American Political Science Association; Toronto, September 2009, proceedings of 
The Annual Meeting o f the American Political Science Association, University o f Toronto, 11.
,9 It is perhaps o f  indication o f how poorly Germany did as a colonial power in general that Tanzania was 
considered its “most valued colony.” From Iliffe, A Modern History o f  Tanganyika, 261. This certainly has 
to do with the lack o f investment, highlighted by Elliot Green in the citation above.
40 Elliot Green, "The Political Economy o f Nation Formation in Modern Tanzania," in Proceedings o f  the 
Annual Meeting o f  the American Political Science Association; Toronto, September 2009, proceedings of 
The Annual Meeting o f the American Political Science Association, University o f Toronto, 1 0.
41 Iliffe, A Modern History ofTangayika, 303. The British had fewer colonists in Kenya than did the 
Germans in Tanganyika by 1914.
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In fact, the only key economic development during the British rule was the 
growth of cash cropping, especially coffee, by Africans themselves outside of colonial
49control. Tanzanians also resisted colonial attempts at controlling economics through 
centralization and coercive agricultural mandates. The relative paucity of economic 
benefit from the Tanganyikan colony, and the same international pressures pushing for 
African liberation which were affecting Belgium in the Congo, made the decision for the 
British to abandon their colonial aspirations in Tanganyika easier than in other colonies 
like Kenya. They engaged in a peaceful transfer of power to the Tanzanians, headed by 
Julius Nyerere, on December 9, 1961. This peaceful transfer was not, however, the 
product of the paternal largesse of former colonizers, rather it also came about due to 
intense political pressure applied by TANU and its activists for many years, including 
Nyerere's pressure on the U.N. to allow the "trustee" state its full rights as an independent 
nation.
Biographical Sketch: Nyerere 
Despite some heirarchization of influence within Zanaki culture, the notion of 
consensus-based decision making and the reality that a functional community could be 
largely devoid of institutional hierarchy stayed with Nyerere his entire life. Kambarage 
Nyerere was born during the March rains of 1922 into the “acephalous Zanaki society” 
and had origins not unlike many of his countrymen.43 The Zanaki largely hunted for food, 
in a “stark... land of granite outcroppings” but were famed cattle raisers as well.44 Zanaki
42 Ibid.
43 Viktoria Stoger-Eising, "'Ujamaa' Revisited: Indigenous and European Influences in Nyerere's Social and 
Political Thought," Africa: Journal o f  the International African Institute 70, no. 1 (2000): 118.
44 Shirley Graham Du Bois, Julius K. Nyerere: Teacher o f  Africa (New York: Julian Messner, 1975), 17.
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communities were often loose affiliations of homesteads spread across the savannah 
region of northwest Tanzania. Decisions were arrived at through negotiations between 
homestead leaders, and discussion would continue until consensus was achieved.45 It is 
important to point out that this consensus was sometimes achieved through forms of 
coercion, and people who violated Zanaki cultural precepts to a profound degree were 
exiled from their community when it was deemed essential.46 Community respect was 
determined largely by gerontocracy, though spiritual and technological practitioners— 
especially rainmakers and blacksmiths—were deemed particularly important to 
community life.47
Nyerere’s mother, Mgaya, the fifth wife in her household and thus not a 
prominent member of it, has been accounted for variously in histories of his life, and 
some modem revisionist histories claim her to be an important practitioner of
48“witchcraft” in her community. Whatever the position of his mother, it is beyond 
dispute that his father, named Burito, was considered a diviner of some talent within the 
region.49 This local influence caused the Gennans to appoint him “chief’ when they 
fonnalized indirect rule powers in the region. According to Nyerere this construct did not 
resonate within the Zanaki community, and neither his father, nor Nyerere himself
45 Stoger-Eising,"'Ujamaa' Revisited." 122.
46 Ibid.
47 For example, see John Iliffe, A Modern History o f  Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), 203. Iliffe suggests that rainmakers were not used only for summoning rains, but were to be 
consulted for all matters o f life, from the mundane upward.
48 Robert Mugagga, "Yes, Nyerere Could Make a Great Saint!" The Observer (Kampala), October 29,
2009.
49 Stoger-Eising, "’Ujamaa’ Revisited,” 124.
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received special treatment from peers because of this titular commendation.50 The 
benefits received from Burito’s position in the colonial system did have profound effects 
on Nyerere’s educational opportunities, however.
Nyerere’s formal education began when he turned 12, when he began attending a 
local primary school in the region.51 At the Native Authority Boarding School in the 
town of Mwisenge, Nyerere’s academic gifts became immediately apparent. A classmate 
recalled that “because of his brilliance” Nyerere became a focus of attention and affection 
from fellow students and teachers alike.52 He was soon transferred to the Tabora Boys 
Secondary School, a Catholic-run institution, and one of the only secondary schools open 
to Africans in the country. Tabora graduates were being groomed by the British to 
occupy management positions within the indirect rule system of governance. It was an 
elitist academy “modeled upon Eton”, and was exclusively open to the sons of chiefs. 53 
These children of “superior upbringing” received numerous privileges, including having 
servants who cleaned up after them.54 At Tabora Nyerere converted to Catholicism in 
1944, and his faith became an instrumental part of the rest of his life, including his 
political philosophies. No account exist to explain the nature of his conversion, but it 
seems his encounter with Catholicism, even within the context of parochial school
50 Ibid., 124.
M Haroub Othman, "Nyerere's Political Legacy," in Tanzania A fter Nyerere (London: Pinter, 1988), 158.
52 Kiluba Lukuba-Mvwanda Nkulu, "Julius Kambarage Nyerere's vision o f higher education for Tanzania" 
(diss., University of Kentucky, 2001), 105. As the school’s name implies it was a school which largely 
catered to the sons o f local chiefs, o f whom Burito Nyerere was one.
’3 Stoger-Eising, "’Ujamaa’ Revisited,” 128.
54 Ibid., 106.
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affected him deeply, and his faith was something profoundly meaningful to him. After his 
conversion he was given the “Christian” name “Julius.”55
Nyerere graduated with distinction from Tabora in 1942, and immediately 
received a scholarship to study at Makerere University, then Makerere College, in 
Uganda. It was here that Nyerere first explored politics as he helped found a chapter of 
the Tanzania African Association, the body which later became the Tanzanian African 
National Union (TANU) political party, at the college.56 After distinguishing himself 
academically at Makerere through mastery of his subject fields and his obvious eloquence 
as a speaker and writer, and attaining a good teaching position at a secondary school in 
Tanzania, Nyerere received the first scholarship of its kind offered to a Tanzanian that
57enabled him to study for his Masters degree at the University of Edinburgh.
Nyerere left for Edinburgh in 1949, and his political interests grew during his time 
in the land of Tanzania’s colonizer. He joined the Fabian Colonial Bureau, an anti­
colonial socialist organization in Britain, and wrote passionately on the subject of East
 ^g
African independence during his time at the university. Upon his return to Tanzania in 
late 1952, he was among a handful of highly educated Tanzanians, and quickly moved 
through the ranks of the Tanzanian African Association to be elected its president in 
1953.
55 Nkulu, "Julius Kambarage Nyerere's vision”, 108. In Shirley Graham Dubois’ Julius K. Nyerere: 
Teacher o f  Africa she quotes Nyerere as saying adopting the name Julius was the only major drawback o f 
converting to Christianity (see page 71).
56 Dubois, Julias K. Nyerere, 75.
57 Ibid., 84. The scholarship also supported his family in Tanzania while he was in Scotland.
58 Iliffe, A Modern History o f  Tanganyika, 508-509.
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Now officially the leading political figure in the nation, Nyerere agitated for 
independence before the United Nations in 1955, and in the following six years led an 
insistent but non-violent push for autonomy from Britain, which was achieved in late 
1961. It was during this crucial period, from 1955-1961, that Nyerere mobilized various 
groups of people, especially women, wage-eamers and the poor, around the vision of a 
TANU-led independent Tanzania.59 While this push toward national unity was not 
without dissent and political contestation, especially from Swahili nationalists and ethnic 
loyalists, it was nothing like the bloody chaos which would birth the political dominance 
of Nyerere’s counterpart in Congo, Joseph Mobutu.
Biographical Sketch: Mobutu 
Mobutu’s early years are somewhat shrouded in mystery as Mobutu routinely 
attempted to “mythologize his own upbringing.”60 While there are a number of 
biographers and memoirists in the French language who have provided perspective on 
Mobutu, only the journalist Michela Wrong in her In the Footsteps o f  Mr. Kurtz provides 
a long form English language take on Mobutu’s life.61 Whatever the paucity of research, 
it is clear that Joseph-Desiree Mobutu was bom in Lisala, Belgian Congo on October 15,
1930. His mother, who came to be known as Mama Yemo, was “either unmarried or
62abandoned by her spouse” when she became pregnant with Mobutu. Some accounts
59 Ibid., 542
6(1 Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps o f  Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink o f  Disaster in Mobutu's Congo (New 
York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 71.
61 Her book is fascinating and a compelling read, but is almost unsourced. Even direct quotations are 
unsourced, only in the end does she make passing references to various works she read researching the 
book. This makes her scintillating prose subject to serious academic critique.
62 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 143.
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place her in the "harem" of an Ngabandi chief when Mobutu was conceived, thus giving 
Mobutu some "chiefly" lineage, though this claim is of questionable legitimacy on 
several levels.63 Regardless, Yemo met and married a local cook named Alberic Gbemani 
while pregnant with Mobutu, a man who died when Mobutu was eight. Mobutu's uncle 
was an important figure in his early life, and was the one who gave him his “Christian” 
name, Joseph-Desiree.
Yemo’s social support network was never strong in her home community of 
Lisala, and she moved to Kinshasa (then Leopoldville), while Mobutu was still a child. 
This migratory impulse was very common in the Belgian Congo in the late 30s and early 
40s as colonial administrators centralized governance and economics in urban areas like 
Kinshasa (Leopoldville) and Lubumbashi (Stanleyville). When he reached school age 
Yemo sent Mobutu to the care of another uncle, this one in Mbandaka, where he attended 
a local parochial boarding school. Like Nyerere, Mobutu’s intellectual abilities were 
immediately evident— former classmates recall him always being in the top three 
students in his classes.64 It was here that Mobutu demonstrated two key qualities that 
differentiated him from his peers: physical prowess, especially through athletic 
achievement, and linguistic capability, often exceeding the abilities of his instructors in 
the French language. Despite these attributes, Mobutu proved to be a troublemaker with 
disdain for authority. In 1949, as Nyerere was travelling to Edinburgh to begin his 
graduate studies, Mobutu ran away from school, an act which was considered a crime at
63 Wrong, Mr. K urtz , 73. This is questionable both because it is unclear whether or not Mobutu legitimately
was connected to the chief, and also the relative authority and power of this chief, even among the 
Ngabandi.
64 Ibid.
18
the time, stowed away on a boat bound for Kinshasa, and when caught was forced to join 
the Force Publique, the Belgian Colonial armed forces, on a seven-year stint.65
His linguistic ability served him well in the Force Publique—he spoke French 
with much greater fluency and style than any of his peers— and he became a translator 
and voracious reader, consuming especially political works such as Machiavelli’s The 
Prince.66 He developed an interest in journalism, and after completing his required seven 
years in the army, during which time he achieved the highest rank available to a 
Congolese, he quit to join the staff of L'Avenir, a French language daily in Kinshasa. In 
1958 he was sent by the newspaper to Brussels to cover the World's Fair, and during his
67time in Belgium met Patrice Lumumba.
With Lumumba, as was the case with Sergeant Joseph Bobozo in the Force 
Publique and the Belgian editor of L 'Avenir, Mobutu continued his pattern of attaching 
himself to people in power above him, and after ingratiating himself, profiting from their 
expertise and connections. True to this method, he quit L'Avenir while in Belgium and 
joined Lumumba's political party. He quickly gained the trust of Lumumba and became 
"one of his top assistants".68 By the end of his twenties, positioned beside Lumumba, 
Mobutu was to be near the center of the political maelstrom that would envelop the 
country as the Belgians ceded power to indigenous leadership. Such was Mobutu’s 
relationship with Lumumba that as the chaos of late 1960 began to overwhelm the
65 Robert B. Edgerton, The Troubled Heart o f  Africa: A History o f  the Congo (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 2002), 199.
66 Ibid.
67 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 143.
68 Ibid., 144. Lumumba's political party was the Mouvement National Congolais.
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president, Lumumba dispatched Mobutu across the country to quell rebellious proto­
movements.69 It was in the chaos after the assassination of Lumumba, which occurred 
with instrumental support from Mobutu, that Mobutu found conditions ripe for his rise to
70power.
Biographies and Trajectories
It is clear that both men possessed remarkable personal attributes which enabled 
them to excel in whatever context they were placed. Both were brilliant, ambitious, 
politically masterful and resilient. It is, in fact, the context of development, as much as 
any other factor, that made Mobutu into Africa's most hated dictator and Nyerere into the 
fondly remembered Mwalimu. Nyerere's constructed connection to the chiefhood 
provided him opportunities unavailable to other Tanzanians at the time. Mobutu, on the 
other hand, had no structural advantages that would prefigure the political success he so 
long enjoyed. His ethnic group was irrelevant on the national scene, he did not complete 
secondary school; his martial advancement had more to do with his language ability than 
his military prowess, although this skill developed as he climbed ranks in the Force 
Publique. It is clear that Mobutu’s political gains were the product of his own wit, his 
ability to manipulate alliances, and his genius in propaganda and patronage systems.
Nyerere, who clearly was a brilliant politician in his own right, was also given as 
many opportunities to succeed as any Tanzanian of his era. His innate talents were 
validated and expanded by his life progression, but had he not been the "son of a chief' or 
had he not been able to attend Tabora or Makerere, he would likely have been an
69 Sean Kelly, America's Tyrant (Lanham, Md.: American University Press, 1993), 27.
70 Ibid., 6. Mobutu gave the Belgians details o f  Lumumba’s activities, and his troops were ‘‘guarding” 
Lumumba when he “surprisingly” managed to leave his protected residence.
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excellent and brilliant school teacher in Tanzania, rather than perhaps the most influential 
African political thinker of all time. Mobutu had no such privileges, and yet clung to 
power in a country that was exponentially larger, more complex and less stable than
71Nyerere's Tanzania.
This contextualizing is important because it speaks to a central theme of this 
thesis: Mobutu and Nyerere were men whose national and personal contexts were deeply 
relevant in determining the leaders they were to become. A Mobutu-type figure could not 
have become the leader of Tanzania because of colonial realities and the nature of 
meritocratic model of African advancement in the German and British colonies. Likewise 
the political context of Zaire made a Nyerere-type leader impossible because of the 
chaotic and violent nature of the system which did not reward thoughtful and inclusive 
politics. Indeed, perhaps Lumumba was as close to a Nyerere as Congo has ever seen, 
and the tragic case of his life serves as a critical example of the impossibility of a 
Congolese Nyerere during the immediate post-colonial era.
71 This is not to say that Mobutu was a better leader, per se, but it certainly suggests that his political skills 
were among the most remarkable of  his era of African leaders.
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Part II. Speaking The Nation
\Authenticite], for me, is a French word. It is... the situation, the life of our 
forbears, how they lived, their mentalities, their actions, their travels. I think.
79— from an interview with an unnamed Zairian JMPR schoolboy, 1975
The word "ujamaa" was chosen for special reasons... it is an African word and 
thus emphasizes the African-ness of the policies we intend to follow.
—Julius Nyerere, 19687J 
In Imagined Communities Benedict Anderson examined the instrumentality of
language in the production of nationalism. He suggested that the language of the nation
operates as a proxy for sacred language, and suggested these "languages-of-state" become
entwined with the will and purpose of the government.74 The elevation of a vernacular to
the position of language-of-state, or the acceptance of an external universal-imperial as
the national language, Anderson argued, profoundly affects the character of the state. In
the period immediately following the end of European colonialism Mobutu and Nyerere
engaged in similar attempts to coalesce divergent ethnic, political and economic inteests
around conceptions of national identity. The languages at the core of these projects were
French, a universal-imperial colonial import, and Swahili, an “elevated” vernacular.
The Zairian schoolboy confused about “authenticity” (authenticite) was a
member of the JMPR, the youth wing of Mobutu’s Mouvement Populaire de la
72 Michael G. Schatzberg, "Fidelite au Guide: The J.M.P.R. in Zairian Schools," The Journal o f  Modern 
African Studies 16, no. 3 (September 1978): 426.
73 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development: Ulntru na Maendeleo: A Selection from Writings and  
Speeches, 1968-1973 (New York: Oxford UP, 1974), 2.
74 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities R efections on the Origin and Spread o f  Nationalism, New  
Edition (New York: Verso, 2006), 84.
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Revolution, and was from Lisala, Mobutu’s birthplace.75 The JPMR schoolboy belied the 
implemented realities of Mobutu’s aspirations for “authenticity” in two key ways. Before 
any attempt to define the term the boy identified that the phrase was derived from French. 
In doing so he expressed alienation from the concept, and distanced its implications from 
his own experience. If the term was in his mother tongue, identification of the language 
would have been unnecessary. Even more critical than his distance from language, is that 
he concluded his remark about the definition of one of the three tenants of Mobutuism 
with the phrase “I think.” His lack of comprehension about this crucial aspect of state 
policy mirrored broader societal disconnect with this legislated attempt to bridge a 
"common cultural heritage" with a "revolutionary" future.76
Mobutu’s use of French as the language of the new state alienated his project 
from the people of Congo. The failure of this nation-building project occurred because 
the ideas behind it had no social meaning, and remained an “outside” conceptualization 
of a deeply internal identification process. If a youth member of Mobutu’s own party, 
from his hometown, propagandized through an education system of Mobutu’s own 
devising could not identity this core principle of the Mobutist state, who could?
Nyerere’s words above provide a counterpoint to the JMPR youth’s confusion. 
Nyerere suggested that ujamaa was a word every Tanzanian would immediately 
recognize and understand, and indeed the idea of family and its social implications was 
obvious to any African society based on kinship networks. Ujamaa is variously
7y Schatzberg, 425-426. The MPR was Mobutu's political party, and until 1990 totally dominated the 
politics of  Zaire, often with legally sanctioned exclusion o f all other parties. The M ouvement Populaire de 
la Revolution is most often Anglicized as the “Revolutionary Popular Movement.”
76 Zaire, Makanda Kabobi, Manifesto at N 'Se/e, by Mobutu Sese Seko (N'Sele, 1967), 30.
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translated, but is best rendered in English as “family-ways.”77 Connecting this political 
philosophy with family tied it to a fundamental principle of self-conception in most 
African communities: kinship.78 Being “authentic” had no such cultural resonance. 
Ujamaa's familiarity to every Tanzanian imbued it with meaning bom of personal 
experience— it was no foreign invader that required identification and explication before 
exploration and implementation. Nyerere further emphasized that ujamaa was an African 
word, reflecting the “African-ness” of his political movement. It is instructive that 
Nyerere focused on ujamaa as an African constmct, and de-emphasized its Tanzanian or 
even Zanaki roots. This speaks to Nyerere's Pan-Africanist aspirations for both his 
national model and for the Swahili language. The language of ujamaa is not identified as 
Swahili; it is simply "African." Despite other failures of his regime, this section will 
argue that Nyerere’s use of Swahili as a nationalizing language was a key factor in 
contributing to the successful development of a de-ethnicized, highly literate, and socially 
connected national populace in post-colonial Tanzania, and that ultimately Nyerere’s 
implementation of Swahili as Tanzania's national language and the language of his 
political philosophy contributed to its rise to become the preeminent African language.
Language in Colonial Tanzania and Congo 
These national languages did not emerge ex nihilo; both French and Swahili 
played important roles in the colonial era of Congo and Tanzania respectively. The 
Belgian’s colonial project was overtly commercial, but relied upon a coercive method of
77 It is also translated as family-hood and family-ness, but "ways" speaks better to its pragmatic intent. 
Nyerere himself translated it as family-hood.
78 See, among many others, Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, A History o f  Sub-Saharan Africa  (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Collins and Burns textbook is one of many synthetic works that 
distill kinship as among the principle, and nearly universal, elements of pre-colonial African societal 
structures.
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commerce that required the routine implementation of brutal military force to generate 
sufficient labor.79 Administrators expressed little desire or experienced any incentive to 
institutionalize an African language for reasons other than administrative utility.
The origins of Lingala, the language that became Congo’s African lingua franca, 
coincide with the first Western incursions— initially in the form of H. Morton Stanley’s 
“exploratory” trips— into Congo’s interior, and does not appear to be an even regionally 
used language prior to that point.80 Unlike Swahili, Lingala was borne to serve the 
immediate needs of colonialists, and their precursors, who were attempting to 
administrate and exploit a vast and culturally non-contiguous space. The eventual 
practice of using Lingala in the colonial military was merely pragmatic, as many 
Congolese in the military were from western provinces, and already spoke Lingala as 
lingua franca. Lingala was also useful because it did not derive from an ethnic
community, a fact which prevented the militarization, and thus empowerment, of any
81 * specific ethnic group. Prior to World War I, the Belgians used parallel African lingua
franca in the militaries of the east (Swahili) and west (Lingala), but unified the military
under Lingala after the war.82 Lingala's repurposing as a lingua franca, bom in Congo of
European imperative, was in the eyes of the colonial administrators preferable to Swahili,
79 So many texts support this claim that is uncontested. Most prominent among accounts o f  the brutality of 
Leopold's regime is Adam Hochschild's King Leopold's Ghost (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999).
80 William J. Samarin, "Protestant Missions and the History of  Lingala," Journal o f  Religion in Africa  16, 
no. 2 (June 1986): 138.
81 There is some dispute about the origins of Lingala, but current consensus points toward the obscurity to 
the point o f  insignificance of  any Bangala "core" ethnic group from which Lingala emerged as a lingua 
franca.
82 Charles Gilman, "Convergence in Lingala and Zairian Swahili," Anthropological Linguistics 21, no. 2 
(February 1979): 106. The heritage of this can be seen in the fact that many Lingala words for weaponry, in 
particular, are directly derived from Swahili. See this section of  Gilman for cases.
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which after World War I was considered a foreign tongue, belonging in British 
colonies.83 Lingala was also deemed preferable to French in military applications, as 
teaching common soldiers French would begin a process of “social elevation,” something 
the Belgians were not keen to encourage among the rank and file of the armed forces.
The preponderant usage of Lingala over French in the military can be seen as early as 
1904.84 The schismatic nature of Belgian identity, pulled between Flemish and Walloon 
cultural-linguistic heritages, provides some explanation of why the Belgians sought to 
slow French assimilationist pretensions which could emerge culturally in Congo. The 
French assimilationist model of colonialism theoretically tied the usage of the French
85language to the “evolution” of an African toward the ideal of French citizenry. Walloon 
French was the language of the Belgian elite, including Leopold II, and was thus deemed 
superior to Flemish, which was used by the working classes. “Protecting” French was in 
the interest of these elite colonialists. The norm of authority in Congo was thus 
established with French as a signifier of power and privilege, Lingala as signifier of far 
less potent African power, and other ethnic languages part of the milieu of the masses. 
French was held as a prized commodity for the elite of Congo’s populace, its serious 
usage “restricted” for most, and passed down to those deemed worthy by the state as
83 This concern with Swahili as a foreign force is similar to concerns many in the administration, including 
Leopold II as an early example, with the possibility of  “English colonies” cropping up within the Congo if 
protestant missionaries were allowed to teach students in English. This led to a prohibition against all 
English instruction. For more see Barbara Yates, "The Origins o f  Language Policy in Zaire," The Journal 
o f  Modern African Studies 18, no. 2 (June 1980): 264.
84 As quoted in Yates, "Origins of  Language Policy,” 261.
85 Benedict Anderson, Im agined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f  Nationalism, New  
Edition (New York: Verso, 2006), 1 10. This claim can be contested by works such as Yates’ "Origins of 
Language Policy," 258. Here she quotes Belgian policy documents which encourage military officers to use 
French when possible with their Congolese soldiers. However, this can be seen as a component o f  the “gift” 
of French for “deserving” Congolese: only elites in the military were encouraged to be fluent in French.
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something of a reward.86 The use of language in symbolic domination suggests that 
French inferred external domination on the Congolese populace, and Congolese who used
87French participated in this stratification and external domination. Further opposition to 
French acquisition by Congolese citizens came from the powerful Catholic Church in 
Congo for reasons similar to the ones eventually propagated by the Belgian colonial 
state.88
The Congolese people also found ways to implement the emergent African lingua 
franca into their social interactions. These pseudo-indigenous lingua franca, largely 
Lingala and Swahili, were used in ethnic interactions as social leveler, “a language 
nobody knows,” as a way to avoid privileging the language of either group in sensitive 
talks. In both colonial and indigenous power hierarchies French was used for the exact
89opposite purpose: deliberate social stratification. A key point on this subject is that 
Lingala and French were both non-ethnic languages applied largely as instruments of 
military and colonial administration, and thus were not socially transmitted in Congolese 
ethnic communities to a large degree.
In addition to English, Swahili was used by the British in Tanganyika, and by the 
Germans before them, for logistic expediency to facilitate the direct rule model of 
colonial administration, in colonial Tanzania “Kiswahili was the national language while
86 Gilman, "Convergence,” 99. See also the section o f  this paper on French as a “false reward” for more on 
indigenous perception o f  the “gift” o f  French.
87 Monica Heller, "Language choice, social institutions, and symbolic domination," Language in Society 24, 
no. 3 (September 1995): 373.
88 Yates, “Language Policy,” 261-263. Yates adds complication to this statement, however, by pointing out 
that many o f  the ground level religious workers, such as missionaries, were lower class Flemish Belgians 
whose own grasp of French was tenuous, and thus had low personal impetus to propagate the language.
89 Gilman, “Convergence,” 100.
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English was the official language.”90 Beyond being simply a “horizontal means of 
communication between various people in society... Kiswahili also became an 
instrument of nation-building, colonial state-formation, and vertical mediation between 
the government and the wider society.”91 This co-option of Swahili, o f course, had 
implications on the development of the language and the perception people had of the 
language itself. However, unlike French, Swahili had a long history as a lingua franca in 
East Africa, and the adoption of Swahili as a language-of-power by colonial 
administrators did not radically transform people’s relationship to the language on a 
practical level. It was still, throughout the colonial period, a language that was more often
92spread through socialization than formal education.
Naming the Nation 
The use of an imperial European language to articulate an authentic African 
context is not without complication. This can be seen in a brief study of the origin of the 
word “Zaire” itself. The term "Zaire" first appeared as Portuguese explorer Diego Cao’s 
bastardization of the Kongo word nzadi, an indigenous name for the great river that 
emptied itself into the ocean at the coast.93 This Portuguese interpretation of nzadi 
travelled back to Europe, where its exoticism briefly caught the attention of the 
enlightenment artists of the period. Eventually it emerged in Voltaire’s famous 
eponymous play. It was the word Zaire popularized in this play that Mobutu interpreted
90 Mazrui, Alamin M., and Ali A. Mazrui. "Dominant Languages in a Plural Society: English and Kiswahili 
in Post-Colonial Last Africa." International Political Science Review  14, no. 13 (July 1993): 280.
91 Ibid., 277.
92 Ibid., 284.
9-1 Kabwit. Ghislain. "Zaire: The Roots o f  a Continuing Crisis." The .Journal o f  Modern African Studies 17, 
no. 3 (September 1 973): 389. Cao was the first European to see the Congo delta.
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as “authentic”, removed the name “Congo,” obviously derived from the Kongo people, 
and replaced it with a French co-opted, Portuguese bastardized, coastal Kongo created 
term for the great river. Such were the complexities of co-opting a European language to 
speak “authentically” about an African cultural product.
In Congo, French was tied to official bureaucracy, and a mastery of the language 
was a pre-condition for entering the petite bourgeoisie of evolues, and with it access to 
the greatest measure of indigenous power in the Belgian colonial state. Despite its 
instrumentality in social mobility, it was not taught in indigenous schools.94 Later, 
language stratification contributed to relative positions in the hyper-bureaucracy of the 
Zairian state, a product itself of the relegation of the petite bourgeoisie to the second tier 
of state power after Mobutu’s meteoric rise. Mobutu presided over the upper level of 
politicians who “clustered around the Presidency and State commissaries” and created a 
“lower level,... the refuge of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie, a group which lost its 
privileges and whose standard of living declined, so that its actual economic position 
[became] closer to that of the labouring masses.” 95 Thus the disparity between the mass 
of Zairians who spoke various ethnic and preponderant African languages and the 
French-speaking elite was made more complex by stratification within the French- 
speaking elite themselves. Indeed, the usage of French was denied to those in "inferior 
capacities" within government beurocracy; they used Lingala officially instead.96 On a
94 Makim M. Mputubwele, "The Zairian Language Policy and Its Effect on the Literatures in National 
Languages," .Journal o f  Black Studies 34, no. 2 (November 2003): 275.
^  J. P. Peemans, "The Social and Economic Development of  Zaire since Independence: An Historical 
Outline," African Affairs 74, no. 295 (April 1975): 162.
% Wyatt MacGaffey, "The Implantation o f  Kimbanguism in Kisangani, Zaire," The Journal o f  African 
History 23, no. 2 (1982): 393.
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structural level, the French language was perhaps the European language least suited to 
the articulation of an alternate nationality and culture, as it “has an unparalleled history of 
concern about its cultural identity” that is “deeply intertwined with the idea of a French 
nation.”97 Despite the Belgian national colonial influence, the French language itself 
intrinsically connected the culture of Congo to both Brussels and Paris.
Neither Mobutu nor Nyerere instituted a language policy off the trajectory of the 
colonial administrators use of language. Doing so would have been pragmatically 
impossible. That said, both had the opportunity to address and modify the strategic 
importance of the national language on a comprehensive level. While Nyerere took 
Swahili, already a major linguistic force in Tanzania, and centralized its importance and 
utility in the state, Mobutu retained the essential ideological and strategic importance of 
French in the state, and continued Belgian policies of Lingala propagation as a second 
tier language of administrative authority, clearly removed from elevated positions held by 
French-speakers.
Language, Ethnicity and Nationalism
During Mobutu’s rise to power in the early 1960s the two major African vehicular 
languages present in Congo were Lingala, based largely in the west, and Swahili, based 
in the east and south, and two relatively minor ones: Kikongo and Tshiluba, both of 
which had stronger ethnic ties than either Swahili or Lingala. While Congo’s first elected 
leader, Patrice Lumumba, spoke fluent Swahili in addition to Lingala, Mobutu spoke no 
Swahili and never learned the language.98 Mobutu, Lumumba's right hand in the late 50s,
97 David A. Murray, "The Cultural Citizen: Negations o f  Race and Language in the Making of 
Martiniquais," Anthropological Quarterly 70, no. 2 (April 1997): 80.
98 Crawford Young, Rise and Decline o f  the Zairian State (Madison, Wis: University of  Wisconsin P,
1985), 154.
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saw the impact of ethnicized politics in Congo in the Katangan secession and the 
implications of ethnically based party politics contributing significantly to much of the 
chaos in the Congo Crisis. Mobutu’s own kinship community had never really been 
among his native Ngbandi, as they were a small ethnic group, unsuited for Mobutu’s 
insatiable ambitions. Instead, he created a pseudo-kinship network in the military, the 
command structure of which was organized around two linguae francae: French and 
Lingala. He did this by maintaining Lingala as the languag of the military, and refusing to 
learn or speak any other African languages, like Swahili, other than his native tongue and 
Lingala. Neither French nor Lingala could be claimed as “belonging” to a specific 
Congolese ethnic group, as French was an obvious foreign import and Lingala was a non­
ethnic indigenous vernacular. Thus Mobutu’s two languages, beyond his mother-tongue, 
Ubangi, were commercial, political, military and utilitarian, but not ethnic. A case study 
of Mobutu’s attempt to create a non-ethnic African identity centers around the 1971 
proces of renaming himself Mobutu Sese Seko. In doing so Mobutu re-christened (or de­
christened) himself using Lingala, the language of his constructed politicized and 
militarized kinship network, rather than his own ethnic Ngbandi mother tongue. Although 
he lacked much formal education, being expelled from Catholic school in junior high for 
running away from school for a romantic tryst in Kinshasa, Mobutu’s relationship with 
French was important at an early age, when his mastery of it exceeded many new army 
recruits, and won him a plum desk jo b ."  He learned French during his first encounters 
with formal education, and French became the language he used for government, political 
theorizing and propaganda. Mobutu was further fighting against an internal ethnic
99 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 174.
31
“redefinition” process which was occurring, a process which was doing the opposite of 
what Mobutu was attempting.100 This “redefinition” was moving particularly urban 
Zairians toward greater differentiation and acceptance of ethnic adherence, rather than 
towards the generic “African-ness” Mobutu was pushing. This process was emerged as 
political parties attempted to create power bases, and the most obvious mechanism for 
doing so was around ethnic identities. Mobutu’s systematic attempts to “de-ethnicize” the 
people of Zaire wilted in the face of the power ethnic identification had to energize 
nascent political mobilization.101 Nonetheless, Mobutu’s political acumen and divide - 
and-rule leadership style was able to quell ethnic mobilization in a way that French could 
not. Using a monolithic non-African language to mitigate against ethnic affiliation was
made more complex as ethnic identity in Africa consists of “interlocking, overlapping,
102multiple collective identities,” few of which, in Congo, were French-based.
Distilling Africanity to a single linguistic form with no pre-colonial connection to 
indigenous identity held little chance for success. Indeed, even at the time some critics of 
Mobutu's authenticite campaign wondered why he did not implement an African 
language to replace French if his stated goal was to faithfully reflect African traditions.
By contrast, Swahili partly de-ethnicized the people who used it simply by its method of 
transmission. It was disseminated through socialization, and thus could act as a 
replacement language for a mother-tongue. In the context of language it is important to 
distinguish between creating a national identity and a shared cultural identity. As Nyerere
100 Ibid., 144.
101 Ibid., 149-150.
102 Young and Turner, citing Southall on page 147. Original source: Aidan Southall, “The Illusion of 
Tribe,” Journal o f  Asian and African Studies 5, no 1-2, (1970) , 44.
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said, “A country which lacks its own culture is no more than a collection of people
1 OTwithout the spirit which makes them a nation.” This becomes the tension between 
constructions of ideology and constructions of identity. Because of the ultimate 
hollowness of the ideology, as suggested at the outset of this paper, Mobutu’s ideology of 
authenticite failed to impact the people he propagandized. The notion of Zaire dissipated 
as quickly as Mobutu himself in 1997, remembered by contemporary Congolese as 
something of a bad dream. Indeed, the intense integration of ideology and identity in 
Mobutuism fated the failure of the political/social system if it could not be integrated as a 
meaningful personal identity by the Zairians themselves. It clearly failed in this respect. 
Ujamaa as political ideology and economic system failed as well, and this 
“conceptualization of Tanzanian socialism as Ujamaa... clearly remained... little more 
than rhetoric” to most Tanzanians.104 That said, Nyerere’s vision of Swahili as a 
transformative language in Tanzania was realized in other ways, as is revealed in a brief 
examination of the development of language.
Swahili has gone through four major stages of development, but began as the 
language of a small coastal ethnic group in East Africa. Ethnic Swahilis interacted with 
Arab Muslim and Portuguese traders and missionaries for centuries prior to the colonial 
era, and through these interactions the language was transformed, and became infused 
with Arabic vocabulary and Islamic theology. Indeed, Islam in East Africa was the first 
force to widely disseminate Swahili, both as a language of trade, and as a “truth-
103 Julius Kambarage Nyerere, Freedom and Unity: U/nint Na Umoja A Selection from Writings and  
Speeches 1952-65 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 186-187.
104 Gregory H. Maddox and James L. Giblin, eds., In Search o f  a Nation: Histories o f  Authority & 
Dissidence in Tanzania (Athens, Ohio: Ohio UP, 2006), 308.
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language” imbued with “the impulse to conversion.”105 With German and British 
colonialism, Islam’s influence in Tanzania’s Swahili-speaking areas waned, and 
Swahili’s development was co-opted by the new dominant power, Germany, as a suitable 
language to organize bureaucracy in the colonial state. The German language had little 
influence on the structure of language, which actually bore more signs of its first 
European linguistic contact: Portuguese.106 German Tanganyika was also the only state 
under German control to use Swahili—they made no attempt to integrate Swahili into 
Rwandan or Burundian administration.107 The decision to administrate through Swahili 
was reaffirmed by Britain when they became “entrusted” with Tanganyika after World 
War I by the League of Nations. British colonial administrators were already familiar 
with Swahili from colonial usage in Kenya, Tanzania’s northern neighbor. This made 
Swahili a connective agent for all of British East Africa. Swahili remained an important 
administrative language in the British East African structure until independence.
The final co-option of Swahili by political authority occurred when Tanganyikan 
nationalists, lead by Julius Nyerere, recognized Swahili as a potentially useful instrument 
in the attempt to create and refine a particular national/African identity among the people 
of Tanzania. This was because it was both “African,” that is Bantu-derived and 
associated with African speakers, and non-ethnic, as the Swahili people made up a 
relatively small component of the population of Tanzania and lacked the demographic
105 Ibid., 14-15.
106 Gilman, “Convergence,” 101. Gilman’s examples o f  Portuguese lexicography in Swahili are mesa 
(table), ananasi (pineapple), and bendela (flag). Gilman points out that these terms are shared between 
Lingala and Swahili because the languages share Portuguese influence in their development.
107 At the time this was, o f  course, one nation called Ruanda-Urundi.
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mass to rise into power on Swahili nationalism. This trajectory of evolution can be seen 
as a movement from a particular language, that of a small ethnic group on east Africa’s 
coast, into its current “universalist stage where the language has become the most widely 
used African language internationally and is becoming the medium of scientific discourse 
and technology.”108 There is great intentionality in the way Nyerere directed this rise, as 
discussed below. Both French and Swahili straddled the universal/particular divide, but in 
the African context Swahili succeeded in ways that French did not. Swahili could be 
“owned” by an African nation, whereas French, at least culturally, derived its linguistic 
authority from the directives and innovations of Paris, and politically from Brussels in the 
case of colonial Congo.
The Implementation of Nationalizing Languages 
An obvious implementation of French in Mobutu’s Zaire was with the articulation 
of the guiding political principles of the nation as put forward in the political theory 
known as Mobutuism. Mobutu’s famous Manifesto at N ’Sele in 1967 provided the 
justification and framework for this paternalistic political philosophy. But how accepted 
and internalized was this top-down directive? A case study produced by Allan Roberts, a 
Congo expert at UCLA, based on his experiences in the early 1970s in Lubanda, eastern 
Congo, reveals some deep dissonance between the French-speaking government based in 
Kinshasa and Zairians in Lubanda who spoke Swahili. Roberts witnessed a sorcery trial 
which was underway, and government officials wished to intervene and impose 
centralized law over the traditional methods of interpretation and imposing justice. The 
locals had executed a suspected sorcerer, and during contestation between a 
representative of the state and a local leader, the frustrated state official realizes he is not
108 Mazrui and Mazrui, "Dominant Languages," 276.
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being taken seriously because he does not speak the local language, and “shouted in 
broken Swahili that 'fire will rain down on you' for allowing the murder to occur.”109 The 
people are nonplussed, and further lose respect for the official as he is unable to speak the 
“real” language of the region with any proficiency. Despite a mastery of Lingala and 
French, the “commandant's broken Swahili was evidence of his outsider status, and a 
source of quiet derision by people in Lubanda.”110 This same dissonance could not have 
occurred in the same way in Tanzania, not specifically because of the prevalence of 
Swahili per se, but because the language of the state and the common language of the 
people were one.
Nyerere’s first encounter with Swahili was at the age of 12, during his initial 
experience with formal education, having spoken only his native Zanaki as a child.111 
Nyerere later made education, and the use of Swahili in it, a fundamental component of 
his political reform and nationalizing vision. This emphasis on education did not consist 
merely of empty promises. Tanzania went from an abysmal literacy rate of approximately 
20 percent at independence to over 66 percent of all citizens in 1976, the highest in 
Africa at the time.112 This had much to do with a policy enacted in 1970 that mandated 
the elimination of illiteracy in Tanzania by 1975 through educational reform, which
109 Allen F. Roberts, "'Authenticity' and Ritual Gone Awry in Mobutu's Zaire: Looking Beyond Turnerian 
Models," Journal o f  Religion in Africa  24, no. 2 (May 1994): 1 56.
110 Roberts, 157.
111 Viktoria Stoger-Eising. ""Ujamaa" Revisited: Indigenous and European Influences in Nyerere's Social 
and Political Thought." Africa: Journal o f  the International African Institute 70, no. 1 (2000): 128.
U2Rodger Yeager, Tanzania: An African Experiment (Boulder, CO: Westview P, 1982), 126.
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113created compulsory education and language instruction . Swahili became the language 
of every strata of Tanzania society, and far beyond Mobutu’s usage of language as a 
political, bureaucratic and propagandistic tool, Nyerere had grander visions for the 
language. He worked to translate some of the most important literary works in the 
English language into Swahili in order to “indisputably refute” notions of the inferiority 
of Swahili to other universal languages. Indeed, Nyerere’s translations of some of 
William Shakespeare’s most famous works manage to impeccably reproduce in Swahili 
the complexity, levels of meaning, and beauty of the words of the man who was arguably 
the English language’s greatest ever practitioner. Nyerere translated Shakespeare’s Julius 
Caesar (Jit lias i Kaizari) and The Merchant of Venice (Mapebari wa Venisi) and oversaw 
the translation of Macbeth. 114 To Nyerere, Swahili was not just a tool for creating a 
nation; it was proof that the expressions of the African mind were equal in quality and 
power to any produced by the function of Western intellect.
Finally, when looking at implementations of these languages by these men, it is 
instructive to look at the ways in which each man named and renamed themselves as a 
way to examine their relationship to language. As mentioned in the biographical sketches, 
Mobutu was bom Joseph-Desiree Mobutu, emerging from the womb imprinted with an 
identity of French origin. Nyerere’s transition from “Kambarage” to “Julius” was, despite 
its origins from the priests at Tabora, was something Nyerere later embraced, and he 
formally used only his middle initial later in life. This was perhaps an attempt to distance
113 Regie Stites and Ladislaus Semali, "Adult Literacy for Social Lquality or Economic Growth? Changing 
Agendas for Mass Literacy in China and Tanzania," Comparative Education Review  35, no. 1 (February 
1991): 53.
114 Phil Noss and Peter Rinju, "Mwalimu Nyerere Engages His People: Scripture Translation in Swahili 
Verse," S1L Journal o f  Translation 3, no. 1 (2007): 41-53.
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the animism of his origins from the devout Catholicism of his later life. An alternate 
explanation would be an attempt to de-ethnicize his name, moving away from Zanaki 
roots to a more generally African identity. Mobutu was content to use his birth name until 
he proclaimed an en masse return to African roots, a move that included casting off 
colonial nomenclature by returning to “African” names. The extent, meaning and utility 
can be questioned at the outset, and it is worth noting that his wife, Marie-Antoinette 
Mobutu, refused to “Africanize” her name.115
Marie-Anoinette provides an interesting entre to briefly examine how gender and 
language interplayed in these regimes. In contrast to French, Swahili is a non-gendered 
language. The pronoun yeye is neutral, and is always either him or her, and this principle 
extends to all pronoun usage in Kiswahili. French ascribes gender to every noun. 
Nyerere’s honorific mwalimu (teacher) must be compared to Mobutu’s “father” honorific. 
Indeed, in a remarkable inversion, Tanzanian female political activists called Nyerere 
mwanangu, my son.116 These two conceptions of leadership, one non-gendered (or at 
least of complex gender orientation), one instrumentally associated with gender, play out 
in the symbols and of the nation presented. Mobutu’s usage of leopard print dates to a 
tale he told about his childhood, and conquering his fears to slay a leopard and claim his 
man-hood. Nyerere, by contrast, elevated the intellectual and agrarian aspects of 
Tanzanian life. Certainly the agrarian life was one which concerned both male and female 
members of society equally. Working for the common good, rather than for Papa 
Mobutu, in Tanzania became a national project both genders could partake in equally, at 
least in theory.
115 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 360.
116 Maddox and Giblin, In Search o f  a Nation, 284.
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Conclusion
Finally, it should certainly be acknowledged that Mobutu and Nyerere had 
different intentions in their national imagination projects. Mobutu’s use of French, and to 
a lesser extent Lingala, reflects his conception of the state as an appendage of his will. 
French suited Mobutu’s personal goals for the state, as it reinforced stratification in 
society between those who could utilize the imperial language and those who could not, 
and by extension those who had access to power and those who did not. Indeed, even this 
disconnect reflected the hollow political ideologies proffered under Mobutuism, which 
embodied a kind of Orwellian double-speak. How could a word like authenticite, 
emanating from a language of oppression and colonization ever hope to deeply reconnect 
Africans to a meaningful sense of their past?
Nyerere’s intentions with Swahili were at once both grander and more simple. 
Nyerere sought to Africanize his people, meaning that he wanted to connect them to an 
identity broader than their nation and ethnic heritages. In doing so, he wanted to make a 
further philosophical point about the elegance, power and beauty of African identify as 
manifest in Swahili, a language he sought to universalize. The current demographics of 
Swahili’s spread into east, and now central and south, of Africa speak to the success of 
this project. Swahili has spread widely from its coastal East African roots, and is now the 
most widely spoken African language, with an estimated 100 million speakers. By 
comparison Lingala firmly remains a language particular to Congo, spoken by 
approximately 10 million people. Nyerere undeniably had much to do with the 
popularization and dissemination of Swahili, even beyond Africa’s borders. Indeed, 
African-American interest in African languages has been focused largely on Swahili (as
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seen in the holiday Kwanzaa, for example) no doubt because of Nyerere’s stances on 
Pan-Africanism, African liberation and his decision to seriously consider and support 
African intellectualism. Nyerere’s sincerity, intellectual acuity and passion for African 
identity transcended his limitations and failings as a political leader, making his legacy in
1 1 7Africa’s modem history one viewed in a largely positive light.
French is still very much a force in Congo today. Congo has become the largest 
French-speaking nation on earth, and French-language music and art produced by 
Congolese definitively impacted metropolitan French and Belgian culture. Congolese 
ethnic identities are still of instrumental importance in modem Congolese politics, and 
were protected, as this paper argues, by the veneer of the imperial language used by the 
state—none of the ethnic co-option of language as occurred in Nyerere’s Tanzania could 
occur in Mobutu’s Zaire. Mobutu’s ideas of Zaire, Mobutuism, authenticite are now 
viewed as ideological smokescreens for his insatiable kleptocratic tendencies, and even at 
the time “fooled no one— except those on the take, who were more than willing to be 
deceived.”118
Benedict Anderson can usefully be invoked again, especially with his comment 
that “All profound changes in consciousness, by their very nature, bring with them 
characteristic amnesias.” French, by its inability to supplant indigenous language 
systems, failed to implement a change in consciousness, and likewise a collective 
amnesia. Indigenous collective memory was firmly entrenched in the colonial period, and 
Mobutu’s language policy did nothing to displace it— if anything he solidified it further.
117 Anthony Bogues, "Julius Nyerere: Radical African Humanism, Equality, and Decolonization," in Black 
Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals (New York: Routledge, 2003), 95-124.
1 ls Roberts, 152.
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French remained a language of the other, Lingala a language of the servant class. Swahili, 
as it passed socially and replaced or supplanted cultural linguistic elements, succeeded in 
the project of imagining a community, because it changed the way the past, and thus 
communal identity, was remembered. Tanzania remembered the “family-ways” because 
Ujamaa political philosophy, for all its failings as an idea and a process, took root in 
socialized modes of communication and community-building in Tanzania.
This section is obviously just the beginning of the process of examining the 
complex ways language, nationalism and African identity interacted in Mobutu’s Zaire 
and Nyerere’s Tanzania in the immediate post-colonial period. The ways in which each 
country’s development and self-concept emerged independently and through interaction 
is of primary importance in understanding how the tension between Africa’s future and 
past are negotiated now, and have been since independence.
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Part III: Writing The Nation 
On February 5,1967 Julius Nyerere delivered one of the most important political 
and philosophical statements of Africa’s modem era, the Arusha Declaration. In elegant 
Swahili Nyerere outlined a vision for Tanzania, and Africa, that would cement his place 
among the handful of leading lights in Africa’s nascent political firmament.119 Just over 
two months later Mobutu Sese Seko delivered a French language articulation of African 
political philosophy, outlining the ideology behind the Zairian state in a document he 
called the N ’Sele Manifesto. Both documents attempted to bridge gaps between 
nationalism and political universalism, but one was received with rapturous praise, the 
other with a deafening silence. This section of the thesis intends to look more closely at 
the ideas expressed in the Arusha Declaration and the N ’Sele Manifesto by placing key 
ideas from each documents in comparison. The second part of this section will briefly 
examine the implementation of these guiding documents in the context of each nation's 
socio-political realities.
Analysis of the Arusha Declaration 
Immediately after the Arusha Declaration was delivered it was heralded across the 
world as a critical document in the development of a distinct African political philosophy. 
Some called it a “clear and unequivocal rejection” of neocolonialism through economic 
exploitation, and that an “Arusha disease.. .started a chain reaction” of liberationist 
thought in the southern, white-minority ruled African states.120 Others called it a “radical
119 Shirley Graham Dubois in Julias Nyerere: Teacher o f  Africa  called it a “twentieth century Magna Carta” 
(177).
120 A. K. Essack, "The Arusha Declaration," Economic and Political Weekly 6, no. 8 (February 20, 1971): 
488.
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break” with previously unsuccessful African attempts to forge a new destiny, and said it 
provided a “vision of a different and better future” for many African nations, not just 
Tanzania.121 C. L. R. James famously called it “the highest stage of resistance ever 
reached by revolting Blacks.” 122 Even critics, like The Washington P ost’s Donald 
Louchheim, said the Declaration provided “an immense psychological boost to 
Nyerere’s .. .nation building.”123 Despite accepting critique, and critiquing himself, on the 
many failures of his leadership, Nyerere himself would say over three decades later, 
“Maybe I would improve on the Kiswahili that was used but the Declaration is still valid: 
I would not change a thing... The Arusha Declaration was what made Tanzania distinctly 
Tanzania.”124 What is in this document that was so heralded by so many?
As the Arusha Declaration begins, Nyerere described the document as being 
“discussed and then published in Swahili.”125 The emphasis on the process of discussion 
rather than accepting sole authorship speaks to a powerful impulse in Nyerere’s 
leadership style, one which impacts the rest of the document as well, towards decisions 
being made by a group, rather than by an individual. Indeed, the relevance of community 
in the life of the nation forms the bedrock of the document. Beyond this the two major 
themes in Arusha are the emphasis on self reliance, and Nyerere’s “deep concern for the
121 Henry Bienen, "An Ideology for Africa," Foreign Affairs 47, no. 3 (April 1969): 559.
122 Quoted in Ikaweba Bunting, "The Heart o f  Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere," The New  
Internationalist, January/February 1999
123 Donald H. Louchheim, "Tanzania Facing Difficulties With Nationalized Economy," The Washington 
Post, February 27, 1967.
124 Bunting, “The Heart o f  Africa.”
123 Nyerere, Ujamaa, 13.
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well-being of the poor, the peasants, and the workers.”126 Initially the document outlines 
generic principles of global socialism, describing the ideal society as one in which “every 
worker obtains a just return for the labour he performs; and the incomes derived from
127 • • *different types of work are not grossly divergent.” Beyond boilerplate socialist
principles such as this, Nyerere contextualizes his vision of political evolution
specifically for the Tanzanian context. Part of the way he achieves this is by critiquing
farm laborers, by a wide margin the largest class of worker in Tanzanian society:
Many do not even work for half as many hours as the wage-eamer does. The truth is that 
in the villages the women work very hard.. .Women who live in the villages o f Tanzania 
work harder than anybody else in Tanzania. But the men who live in villages.. .are on 
leave for half their lives . . . 128
The remaining content of the Arusha decleration provides a critique of money as 
the basis of economy, the problems with excessive foreign aid, and the need for
• ’ 129Tanzanians to engage in “hard work.. .[which] is the meaning of self reliance.”
Nyerere’s desires for the nation, combined with reflections on the realities of the 
challenges in front of them, conclude the brief text.
Analysis of the N ’Sele Manifesto 
The N ’Sele Manifesto was presented as the guiding document for Mobutu’s
130political party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR). As all other political 
parties were outlawed at the time of the N ’Sele Manifesto’s production, this directly
126 Godfrey Mwakikagile, Tanzania under Mwalimu Nyerere: Reflections on an African Statesman (Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania: New Africa Press, 2006), 58.
127 Julius K. Nyerere. Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 15.
128 Ibid., 31.
129 Godfrey Mwakikagile, Tanzania under Mwalimu Nyerere: Reflections on an African Statesman (Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania: New Africa Press, 2006), 55.
u’° This is most often translated into English as Popular Movement of the Revolution.
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elucidated official state doctrine. The document’s central thesis was provided in its 
introduction: “The MPR wishes to make Zaire a genuinely independent country. Its 
doctrine is Mobutuism.”131 The subsequent portions of the Manifesto address the ways in 
which the MPR will “revolutionize” various elements of Zairian society including 
education, the role of women in society, economics, the arts and youth culture, among 
many others. Much of the document contains vague language about how these changes 
will occur, for example the suggestion that “The MPR affirms that all Zairians should be 
able to profit from the goods of modem civilization.”132 Such vague proclamations about 
“enhancing youth” and “protecting folklore” permeate the Manifesto, and very few 
tangible statements about how specifically the MPR will achieve these goals were 
offered.
The primary theme of the Amsha Declaration was self-reliance, and by contrast 
the “N ’Sele Manifesto declared nationalism to be the doctrinal touchstone of the 
MPR.”1 The obvious implication is that rather than relying on the people of the state to 
elevate the nation, the people of Zaire were expected to rely on the party to elevate the 
nation. The most important philosophical concept in the N ’Sele Manifesto is the concept 
of “authenticity”.134 This doctrine, although ostensibly about maintaining African cultural 
motifs in the modern era, really had more to do with an umbrella concept under which 
such activities as the nationalization of foreign companies could be justified. Young and
ljl1 Zaire, Makanda Kabobi, Manifesto at N 'Sele , by Mobutu Sese Seko (N'Sele, 1967), 5.
L’2 Makanda Kabobi, N ’Sele, 13.
1.3 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 209.
1.4 While N ’Sele never uses the word “authenticite” explicity, its tenants are expounded and articulated 
throughout the document in the guise of what Crawford Young and Thomas Turner call “authentic 
Congolese nationalism.”
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Turner helpfully segment the nuanced development of authenticity as a central regime
construct as having three key phases:
From 1966 until about 1970, ‘authentic Congolese nationalism’ was the regime 
motif. In 1971 this was eclipsed by an ambitious promotion of “authenticity” as a 
philosophic innovation of the new order. In 1974, this in turn was supplanted by
1 T ^‘Mobutuism.’
Despite these evolutionary changes, authenticity was purportedly about a return to 
the African past from which Zairians drew their cultural power. Immediately after its 
introduction the doctrine of authenticity came under internal critique for two primary 
reasons: it engaged in “undue glorification of the past”, prominently espoused by 
Catholic leaders, and due to “the vagueness of the creed,” a critique championed by 
intellectuals.136 While much of Mobutu’s sincerity as a political ideologist has been 
rightly questioned, it is clear that Mobutu viewed the Manifesto, and its keystone concept 
of “authenticity," as a move towards being taken seriously not just as a “leading political 
figure, but also as a major thinker; this explains the decision to unveil ‘authenticity’ at a 
congress of Senghor’s Union Porgressiste Senegalaise in Dakar rather than before a
i -j n
home audience.” The clear implication is that Mobutu was attempting to position 
himself as a continental political thinker and philosopher, not merely a masterful political 
figure; undoubtedly, his desire to do so had much to do with Nyerere’s prominence and 
his perceived place in the hierarchy of African political thinkers. However, unlike 
Nyerere, Mobutu did not have a cache of international intellectual goodwill that would 
enable his Manifesto to be heralded, or even taken seriously. Thus, in 1973 when “a 
major international colloquim was announced” at which intellectuals from around the
1:0 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 208.
136 Ibid., 212.
137 Ibid., 210.
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globe were expected to “acclaim and elaborate authenticity,” no prominent intellectuals 
could be enticed to attend, and after two postponements, this legitimizing effort was 
abandoned.138
Connecting the Texts 
Even with cursory examination it is clear that the N ’Sele Manifesto is highly 
derivative of the Arusha Declaration. Using a “founding” document to articulate a party 
platform, as Nyerere had done with TANU in the Arusha Declaration, was the motif of 
N ’Sele as well. Major themes of critiquing capitalism’s inadequacy in the African 
context, the need for a mobilization of human capital, and the need for comprehensive 
reform in all aspects of national life read very similarly in the two texts. One interesting 
connection, in the light of history, is that both texts advocate for the liberation of white - 
minority dominated southern African states. While the Arusha Declaration only contains 
a one line pledge to “co-operate with all political parties in Africa engaged in the
139liberation of all Africa,” the N ’Sele Manifesto goes into much greater detail. The 
manifesto specifically mentions Rhodesia as deserving concerted focus and effort from 
all “liberated” African states to achieve independence—Rhodesia being the nation of 
most interest and international attention at the time on issues of African majority-led 
governance.140 As the next section will reveal, Mobutu and Nyerere wound up on either 
side of the liberation struggles in South Africa, but this divergence was not revealed in 
these documents.
l ,s Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 212. 
ly; Makanda Kabobi, N ’Sele , 28-29.
140 Ibid.,  29.
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There are certainly dramatic differences between the texts as well. The final 
resolutions articulated in Arusha regard the behavior of the leaders of the party. Calls to 
radical accountability, relative poverty, and a total freedom from corruption are 
powerfully articulated in Nyerere's Declaration, and he personally took the commitment 
to simplicity and incorruptibility to heart. Despite vague claims about fair representation 
and avoiding personal enrichment, nothing in the N ’Sele Manifesto speaks to the 
accountability of party leadership, or demands responsibility in the use of power.141 
Also, Nyerere’s Zanaki heritage, and its aforementioned acephelous leadership structure, 
by nature presumed that leadership through consensus building was not only functional 
but also elegant and powerful. Mobutu also claimed a connection to “traditional” 
leadership to justify his own political structure, but with the opposite purpose. “In our 
African tradition, there are never two chiefs... [and] after having taken counsel and 
informed himself, he must decide and resolve the issue alone, in full cognizance of the 
problem.”142 In this trajectory these documents have remarkable different objects.
On the most basic level, Arusha can be construed as a document dedicated to 
promulgating “self-reliance.”143 N ’Sele, on the other hand, is a document devoted to 
instructing the populace to rely on the MPR and its “guide” Mobutu. 144 The document 
even promises that the MPR will “liberate Zairian men and women from all subjugation
141 Ibid., 11.
142 Quoted in Young and Turner's Rise and Decline on page 211, but is originally from Mobutu: Discours, 
allucutions, messages et 7965-1975 (Paris: Editions J.A., 1975) 2: 100-101
14j Indeed, the preamble and the conclusion both focus on the objects of reliance traditionally used in 
Tanzania: money and society, as the primary fork in the decision tree.
!44 The entire document uses the state as the agent of  action in the text.
48
and assure their progress by promoting a truly social and truly democratic republic.”145 
This claim, which burdens the state with all the responsibility for liberating the populace, 
is an effective encapsulation of the tone and sentiment of the larger document. N'Sele 
further quashes individual action by warning "that individual liberties may lead to 
anarchy, [so] the authority of the regime" could not be challenged.146 Despite these 
differences, it is clear that the idea of a seminal "founding text" as presented in the 
Arusha Declaration was just what Mobutu was after. This was not the first time Mobutu 
had sought to emulate Nyerere, nor would it be the last.
One anecdotal example of Mobutu’s desire to follow Nyerere's lead was 
embodied in the costume known as the abacost. From the declaration of “authenticity” in 
1967 until the “Third Republic” political liberalizations of 1990, Zairian men were 
required by law to wear the abacost instead of westem-style suits. The dress itself, 
however, was not a product of Mobutu’s vision of an “authentic” society, rather it was 
borrowed from the wardrobe of Julius Nyerere. This simple, plain suit was worn by 
Nyerere throughout his time in leadership and until the end of his life. Inspired by the 
fashion of the egalitarian Chinese and the Indian nationalist Nehru, Nyerere adopted the 
suit as an alternative to western suits, and also as a way to indicate his connection to the 
average Tanzanian.147 Ironically in Zaire, “the poor could not afford to equip their 
wardrobe with this garb, which soon became a sartorial symbol of class, rather than an 
articulation of national identity.”148 Abacost wearers were “politicians [in the] top
145 Zaire, Makanda Kabobi, Manifesto at N 'Sele, by Mobutu Sese Seko (N'Sele, 1967), 8.
146 Kevin C. Dunn, Imagining the Congo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1 14.
147 Godfrey Mwakikagile, Nyerere and Africa: End o f  an Era (New York: New Africa Press, 2006), 507.
148 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline , 1 1 7.
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cadres... owners of Mercedes cars.”149 In both societies the abacost was a class symbol, 
but in Tanzania it was a class leveler, in Zaire it became the costume of privilege. This 
dichotomy is also true of these documents. The N'Sele Manifesto was not widely read, 
not least because relatively few Zairians could read French by 1967, but served as 
something of an ego stroke for those already in the cadre in power in Zaire. The Arusha 
Declaration, on the other hand, was widely distributed in both Swahili and English, and 
became a touchstone text for many around the continent, and the world, to engage with 
and be empowered by. The founding texts themselves, like the abacost, was not 
important because of the form, which was shared, but because of what filled it, which 
was not. Even though the N ’Sele Manifesto was meant to be the “basis of the obligatory 
instruction in civics in all the schools in the country” it's message was not widely 
received or understood.150 Like most other social constructs in Mobutu’s Zaire, education 
became a tool for leverage. Eventually, a university education “became necessary (but 
not sufficient) for entry” into the elite of society.151 Thus, parroting truths of the N'Sele 
manifesto, like the abacost, was simply another marker for someone wanting to enter the 
elite classes of society, not a set of truths which would guide the construction of a nation.
Another similarity in the outcomes of the documents was the nationalizations of 
industry which were justified by N ’Sele and Arusha. American newspapers strongly
152connected the ideological documents with the pragmatics of nationalization. The
149 Ibid., 132.
130 Michael G. Schatzberg, "Fidelite au Guide: The J.M.P.R. in Zairian Schools," The Journal o f  Modern 
African Studies 16, no. 3 (September 1978)
131 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 136.
132 The New York Times, "Tanzania on Road to Rural Socialism," January 26, 1968.
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Arusha Decleration especially makes clear the "centrality of state control of the
  1 STeconomy" in Tanzania. The disastrous nationalization of agriculture in Tanzania, 
probably Nyerere's worst tactical mistake in his presidency, was borne of ideas first 
espoused in the Arusha Declaration.154
Conclusions
As “Zaire” has been erased from maps, and “Congo” has taken its place, so the 
N ’Sele Manifesto has dissipated totally from the Congolese national consciousness, 
although it seems never to have gained purchase in the first place. "Authenticity" proved 
to be a doctrine which was as ephemeral and ultimately meaningless as anything else 
ideologically proffered by Mobutu’s regime. It is telling that some of the first moves of 
the post-Mobutu regime were to rename the country, taking the name originally provided 
by Leopold II, rather than maintain the nomenclature of the Mobutu regime; such was the 
failure of Zaire as an idea.155
Arusha persists, now seen more as a philosophical text produced by a "radical 
thinker" than a legitimate political system.156 Nyerere's Pan-Africanism gains more 
credence even as his model of civic life in Tanzania fades, and historians contest the 
merits of his presidency. To Nyerere, however, the Arusha Declaration was meant to be
153 KLjell J. Havnevik, Tanzania: The Limits to Development from  Above  (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, 1993), 43.
154 Nyerere himself admitted as much later in life. He articulates this failing especially clearly in Ikaweba 
Bunting, "The Heart o f  Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere," The New Internationalist, January/February 
1999. "
1x5 Nicholas Kristoff, "In Congo, a New Era With Old Burdens," The New York Times, May 20, 1997.
156 Indeed it is featured in Anthony Bogues' "Julius Nyerere: Radical African Humanism, Equality, and 
Decolonization," in Black Heretics, B lack Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals (New York: Routledge, 
2003).
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something embedded in Tanzanian society’s DNA—not something that he put there, but 
something he found which was there already.157 The reality of this hope, and whether 
Nyerere's legacy in Tanzania continues to inspire its people, remains to be seen.
The use of language in each national project also connects to this thesis' larger 
theme of limited contextual determinism in each leader's political policies. Neither leader 
altered language policies inherited from the colonial administrations dramatically. 
Nyerere's implementation of Swahili was certainly more nuanced and influential than 
Mobutu's usage of Lingala, but the language themselves evolved rather than were 
transformed, or even replaced, during the transition to independence. There were 
logistical considerations, or course, in addition to the ideological benefits of maintaining 
a colonial and "African" language in these new states, but as this section intended to 
demonstrate: the uses and implementations of language in each context dramatically 
impacted the success of each nationalization project.
1:>7 This comes out in the Ikaweba Bunting interview, see citation 154 above.
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Part IV. Zaire, Tanzania and the U.S. in the Cold War Context
"When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers."
158Gikuyu proverb
On the morning of August 9, 1974, as Richard Nixon, who only moments before 
had been President of the United States, awkwardly waved his V-shaped fingers in the 
air, a rogue’s smile on his weathered face, and boarded Navy One for the last time, Henry 
Kissinger remained behind in the White House. Indeed, just under the massive headline 
"NIXON RESIGNS" on the.front page of that day's New York Times ran the sub-heading 
'"Sacrifice' is Praised; Kissinger to Remain." 160 Such was the association between these 
men. That immortal V salute signaled the death rattle of the "painfully excruciating"
158 Eric Walters and Adrian Bradbury, When Elephants Fight (Victoria, B.C.: Orca Book Publishers, 2008). 
This is likely, in fact, an apocryphal quotation, but it is also probably the most famous of  the so-called 
"African proverbs."
159 Ollie Atkins, Nixon departs, August 9, 1974, Washington, D.C.,
http://www.judiciaryreport.com/images/Richard-Nixon-Helicopter.jpg (accessed June 11, 2010).
160 John Herbers, "Nixon Resigns," The New York Times, August 8, 1974.
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national experience that was the collapse of the Nixon years.161 Kissinger remained, and 
inherited much of the nation’s pent up anger with Nixon and with the government in 
general. The nation was raw with feelings of self-doubt in the wake of the Vietnam 
debacle and the moral collapse of the Presidency. While Gerald Ford entered office 
largely free of the dirt that Nixon would never wash away, it was undoubtedly Kissinger 
who was the intellect behind the last vestiges of the Nixon White House, and it was only 
Kissinger who had any chance of redeeming, at least partially, one of the most humiliated 
executives in American history and, by proxy, himself.
Meanwhile, thousands of miles away in Africa a new hot phase of the Cold War 
was developing. Freshly independent African nations were aligning and re-aligning 
themselves with the great powers, leveraging the behemoths against each other in service 
to their own nationalistic visions. The last major hold-outs of white minority rule- South 
Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and Southwest Africa- faced increasing foreign, 
domestic, and intra-African pressure to allow black majority-rule. Within this context, 
Julius Nyerere and Mobutu Sese Seko were seeking ways to quell, or at least distract, 
domestic dissidents and gain influence and relevance in the region.162 In 1976 these three 
instrumental leaders, Nyerere, Mobutu and Kissinger would converge through diplomatic 
engagement around the Angolan Civil War conflict. Through these interactions a 
microcosm of the way Cold War diplomacy was carried out by the United States on the 
continent of Africa was generated.
161 Stephen W. Stathis, "Nixon, Watergate, and American Foreign Policy," Presidential Studies Quarterly 
33, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 129.
162 The country o f  Belgium has accepted responsibility for the slaying, and the 1979 Church Report 
recognized formal American involvement in the assassination plot. Larry Devlin, the CIA Station Chief at 
the time reported in his book C hief o f  Station, Congo that Eisenhower had ordered him to kill Lumumba by 
poisoning, but because of  a moment of moral vacillation, the Belgians got to him first through Mobutu.
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The intention of this section, then, is to specifically examine the triad relationship 
between Henry Kissinger, then the U.S. Secretary of State, the President of Tanzania 
Julius Nyerere, and the President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko. This will be examined 
through two lenses. The first engages the broader history of U.S. involvement in Africa 
during the Cold War, and situates the importance of these three men in the broader 
historical context. The second section explores the personal as political— looking through 
Kissinger’s eyes at these two men, and asking questions of these relationships and the 
ways tensions between reality and the ideal played out during Kissinger’s trip to Africa in 
1976.
America in Africa
American involvement in African affairs began prior to the formal existence of 
the United States. The dubious origin of this relationship can be traced to the moment that 
the first Africans were sold into slavery in Jamestown in 1619.163 A massive importation 
of African slave labor followed. This forced migration across the notorious Middle 
Passage ultimately impacted American history in the most profound ways possible, even 
to the point of bringing the Union to the brink of destruction. Even after the end of 
slavery Africa and America maintained a complex, unequal relationship— a relationship 
which continues to this day.
During Africa's colonial period America’s influence was obvious. While America 
received no formal African holdings during the Scramble beyond its extant connection to
163 Alden T. Vaughn, "Blacks in Virginia: A Note on the First Decade," The William & Mary Quarterly 29, 
no. 3 (July 1972): 470.
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the “independent” Liberia,164 the United States sanctioned the partition of the continent 
and had powerful economic interests in the region long before and after 1895. The rising 
American demand for consumer goods, and the subsequent demand for the raw materials 
required to produce them, became much of the impetus behind European colonial 
extractive economics in the African colonies. After independence, however, American 
interest in African affairs abated as other concerns like Vietnam and domestic political 
strife pulled attention inward. The U.S. was also dealing with the expansion of the Cold 
War's tentacles in other parts of the world. This brief period of ignoring Africa would end 
soon after Navy One flew Richard Nixon into permanent political exile, and Henry 
Kissinger turned his attention to Southern Africa.165
This section will shift the focus of this paper westward, not to remove attention 
from the key figures at the heart of this thesis, but to explore these men through the eyes 
of the most powerful nation in the world in the late 1970s. This is possible because of 
nature of Kissinger himself. Because of the complexity of his motives, the prominence of 
his power and the contested nature of his legacy, Kissinger can be viewed as something
164 Liberia is complex to classify on the continuum of colonial project vs. independent African state. 
American involvement begins with the migration project o f  African ex-slaves “back to Africa” culminating 
in Liberian independence in 1847, a move which can be construed as an American colonial action 
conducted by Afro-descended Americans, as they clearly established their governance as an elite over 
indigenous peoples o f  the region. The color o f  the skin of  the “colonizers” complicates the conventional 
colonial narrative, but had these initial settlers happened to be white, Liberia would certainly have been 
classified as a colonial project orchestrated by Americans.
165 As we circle back to Kissinger, and use his writings in much of this section, it is appropriate to ask if 
there has been a more discussed American diplomat than Henry Kissinger? It would be difficult for any 
other potential candidate to match Kissinger's prodigious writings on his own diplomatic career— his three 
volume set concerning his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations comes in at over 3,500 pages. This 
says nothing about the many volumes others have written on the man, his policies, psychology and 
influence. Kissinger is so discussed and dissected precisely because he functions as something of a 
Rorschach test for the American public. Equally despised and admired by neo-conservatives, liberals, 
centrists, idealists and realists alike, Kissinger is a proxy for all manner of American perceptions of  failings 
and successes in foreign policy. Certainly no figure has dominated the discussion o f  American foreign 
policy in the last quarter o f  the 20,h century more than the Harvard-trained immigrant.
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of a proxy for the United States. Because of this he proves a useful figure to follow in 
order to examine two of Africa’s most influential leaders in the late 1970s, Julius Nyerere 
of Tanzania, and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.166
The Frying Pan and the Fire: Angola in the Shadow of Vietnam
This famous image seemed to capture in one frame the chaos that permeated the 
American withdrawal from Saigon, and continues to dominate the national memory of 
the end stages of the Vietnam War. The image symbolized that the dawning national 
realization that in Vietnam terror had triumphed over reason. This irrational fear was 
played out by the dozens of people trying to get on that last helicopter, frantically trying 
to escape from “the one clear failure in American military history.”168 The image distilled 
the humiliating withdrawal process for which Kissinger endured much critique. These 
raw feelings of failure and frustration, coupled with the national shame and anger 
associated with Nixon’s Watergate implosion, left Kissinger in a delicate position as Ford
166 Indeed, Kissinger himself told a meeting of members o f  Congress that Zaire “is a very rich country and 
could be the keystone to political and economic progress in Africa” and that Tanzania was the “ intellectual 
leader of  Southern Africa.” -  From the MOC, Bipart Congress, May 12, 1976.
167 Hubert Van Es, Vietnam Airlift, April 29, 1975, Saigon, Vietnam. Universal Press International.
168 Chalres Mohr, "History and Hindsight: Lessons From Vietnam," The New York Times, April 30, 1985.
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took office. America was experiencing “emotional exhaustion” and self doubt, and the 
presidency seemed less austere and transcendent than at any other point in history.169
It had been so different only a few years before. Kissinger became a major 
political force during his time in the Nixon White House. Scholars like Jussi Hanhimaki 
have suggested that Nixon even “lost the struggle for the limelight to Kissinger” during 
his own presidency. 170 By the end of Nixon’s time in office, it was Kissinger, not Nixon, 
who was “the leading policy maker” in the administration.171 Had Nixon left office under 
remarkably different circumstances Kissinger's prominence could have immortalized him 
among the most important and influential cabinet members in U.S. history, but instead his 
place in a scandal-ridden administration deeply tainted his reputation as the executive 
branch imploded under the weight of Nixon’s indiscretions. Finding a major policy 
victory under Ford then became vital for Kissinger’s personal rehabilitation, as well as 
the self-concept of the embittered country. It was during this crucial time in the life of the 
nation and his personal career that Kissinger turned his gaze to Angola.
By November of 1975 Ford had been President for just over a year, and continued 
Nixon’s “policy of supporting Portuguese control of Angola and Mozambique, feeling
172that it represented the best possibility for stability in Southern Africa." This tactic 
dovetailed with the American policy of publicly criticizing and privately supporting
169 Henry A. Kissinger, "Lessons for an Exit Strategy," August 12, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.eom/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/l 1/AR2005081101756.html (accessed 
May 11, 2010).
170 Jussi M. Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 291.
171 Ibid., 292.
172 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 686.
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white minority rule in Southern Africa. Part of the reason for this seemingly incoherent 
policy in Southern Africa was that “before 1975 Kissinger paid little attention to political 
developments in Africa.”173 A coherent foreign policy was not possible in a region that 
received no attention from the Secretary of State. Kissinger was certainly not alone in this 
disinterest. Africa was not viewed as an American “problem” and seemed to possess little 
strategic relevance to America’s broader foreign policy interests. This view changed 
dramatically in late 1975.
The catalyzing event to pull America’s gaze to Southern and Central Africa was 
Angolan independence, which formally occurred on November 11, 1975. This happened 
amidst rising political fears about the future of Angola that were triggered by a 
convergence of political and economic concerns, both international and domestic, which 
surrounded which "way" Angola would ultimately go. Within the broader Cold War 
context, Angola looked to be a new front in the proxy hot war between the USSR and the 
United States. White-minority led nations like Rhodesia and South Africa did not want 
Angola to become a leftist state, as it would inevitably serve as a base for liberation 
movements against them. These concerns and a complex of other factors led to the 
explosion of violence in Angola in 1975.
First, the Carnation Revolution, which culminated in April of 1974, ended the 
dictatorship in Portugal and the leaders of the new junta pushed for rapid decolonization 
and democratization within former Portuguese foreign territories, especially in Africa.174
173 Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge: Belknap Press of  Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 237.
174 There were many reasons for the push for decolonization, but certainly a factor was the cost to the 
treasury to maintain colonial holdings. The desperately poor nation spent approximately 40 percent of its 
national budget on quelling African freedom fighters in Mozambique and Angola in 1974.
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The vacuum left by the sudden withdrawal of Portuguese forces and political leaders, 
combined with the remaining presence of the black Angolan groups who were in the 
process of fighting the Portuguese for freedom, meant factionalized, armed Angolan 
forces were left to determine who would run the newly free nation. There were three 
main factions which emerged from this period. The MPLA, a leftist group backed by the 
USSR and Cuba came to control the formal government and Luanda after 
independence.175 The FNLA under Holden Roberto became the primary group backed by
* 1 7 6 *the United States and its allies, especially Zaire. Finally in the south of Angola was a 
group called UNITA under Jonas Savimibi, also backed by the United States but to a 
lesser extent than the FNLA.177 These groups emerged as opposing powers immediately 
after independence and the nation was plunged into civil conflict that would continue for 
16 years. Seeing the potential for Angola to go “either way,” and the relevance of the 
state to broader Southern African politics, both the United States and the Soviets began
178supporting various factions in the conflict. Primarily the U.S. used its regional proxy, 
Zaire, to supply and train the forces under Holden Roberto in the FNLA, but also 
supported UNITA, who drew support from South Africa, another ally of the United 
States in the region.
175 MPLA stands for Movimento Popular de Libertagao de Angola  or Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of  Angola.
176 FNLA stands for Frente Nacional de Libertagao de Angola, or the National Front for the Liberation of 
Angola.
177 UNITA stands for Unido Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola  or the National Union for the 
Total Independence o f  Angola.
178 Ultimately it was Cuba, however, who provided the MPLA with the most military and economic aid 
during the Angolan conflict, particularly in the early years of the fighting.
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Beyond global politics, the situation in Angola, and the world of Henry Kissinger, 
the mid-1970s had also been hard on Julius Nyerere and Mobutu Sese Seko. Nyerere had 
overseen steady economic growth in Tanzania in the late 60s, emerging from principles 
elucidated in the Arusha Declaration, and enjoyed much early success in his ujamaa 
socio-political program. In the early ‘70s Nyerere’s economic and social policies looked 
to be bearing fruit, and his vision of societal reinvention by being true to “African 
traditions” seemed to be succeeding. However, in the mid-1970’s forced “villagization” 
of the rural populace, increasingly corrupt lower-level leadership, years of drought, the 
1973 oil crisis, and disastrous nationalizations of business substantially weakened the 
state.179 Nyerere was in danger of losing power and relevance in the region, and saw in 
the Southern African liberation movements a situation of personal concern to him which 
also would allow him to re-assert regional influence and power even as domestic 
problems grew.
As acknowledged by Zaire experts like Crawford Young, Mobutu Sese Seko
enjoyed public support through rising to power and asserting political stability after a
180tumultuous, violent five year period following independence in 1960. His subsequent 
moves toward dictatorship, like banning all political opposition, were not widely 
criticized because the consolidation of power seemed to herald even more years of 
national stability. The people of Zaire were also ready for a definitive end to the internal 
ethnic and political divisions inevitable in a country the size of Western Europe which 
contained over 200 ethnic groups. However, things began to collapse for Mobutu around
179 For more on this, especially the crises early in the decade see John Iliffe, A Modern History o f  
Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1999).
180 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 220.
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the same time as Tanzania began slipping into economic trouble. Similar factors like the 
oil crisis, regional drought and growing political pressures related to Cold War 
escalations impacted Zaire. The biggest factor in Mobutu’s weakening position, however, 
was the precipitous decline of copper prices in the early ‘70s. After years of continually
increasing in value, copper prices fell 18% from 1974-1975, and did not recover for over
181three years. The economic engine of Zairian society was in the Copper Belt region, 
called Shaba, and the decline in revenue from that region precipitated something of a 
national economic meltdown. Mobutu sought an external distraction to draw focus from 
the economic collapse, and also believed that a friendly government in Angola would 
lead to cheaper export costs for copper through Angolan rail lines.
Kissinger, Nyerere and Mobutu all needed success in Angola for their own 
futures. Despite Angola’s previous irrelevance in geo-politics, these three powerful men 
had personal, political and foreign policy problems which looked like they could be 
solved by a major success in Angola. Each had differing conceptions of what that success 
would look like, but the potential for collaboration existed between these men, and 
ultimately it was Kissinger who would be the connection between them all.
Kissinger: Recollections and Inventions 
Kissinger went to Africa with a sympathetic ear for the concerns of leading
African statesmen as part of his “new willingness to use moralism as a foreign policy
1 82tool.” 1 He signaled his intent, and new-found commitment to black majority rule, in his 
departure statement where “he spoke of the ‘commitment of the U.S. to majority rule in
181 Porter, K. E., and D. L. Edelstein. ’’Copper Statistics: U.S. Geological Survey.” Report. U.S. Geological 
Survey, 2009.
l82Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography , 686.
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the black African countries.’”183 This new moral commitment meant that he needed to 
treat Nyerere with particular respect as he was “key to any solution” to the troubles 
embroiling Southern Africa.184 Nyerere’s instrumentality was not borne of his country’s 
political prominence, but because of Nyerere’s moral and intellectual preeminence 
throughout the region.
Almost immediately upon arriving in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Kissinger seemed 
seduced by Julius Nyerere, saying he found him “graceful and elegant, his eyes sparkling, 
his gestures fluid,” and because he possessed an “awesome command of the English
185language... Nyerere could be a seductive interlocutor.” In a different context this kind 
of language could have been the words o f schoolboy to a crush. Indeed, at a parade early 
in his visit to Tanzania, Kissinger recalled sitting "beside Nyerere in the presidential box. 
He looked cool and elegant in a light gray bush suit. I felt clumsy and uncomfortable in 
my blue pinstriped diplomat’s uniform.”186 To recall so acutely some 23 years later a 
feeling of personal inadequacy when placed in contrast with Nyerere reveals the intensity 
with which Kissinger was struck by the man. More remarkable is that this powerful 
moment did not occur.
As the photograph below indicates, Kissinger was not sitting next to Nyerere at 
the parade in question; in fact, Nyerere oversaw the parade from a podium on the parade
183 Ibid., 687.
184 Henry Kissinger, Years o f  Renewal (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 932.
183 Ibid.
186 Ibid.,  935.
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grounds (seen in the background of the image below) and only afterward met with
187Kissinger in a private room for conversation and discussion:
mmm mmm
Further vividly recalled details by Kissinger, such as a patronizing recollection of 
Tanzanians soldiers unintentionally hurling off sandals during attempts to goosestep, are
189belied by previously unreleased photographic evidence of the event. Here are the 
supposedly sandal-clad troops:
187 According to archivists at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, these photographs taken by White 
House photographer Ricardo Thomas during K issinger’s trip to Africa have never been reviewed by 
another researcher nor have they been published in any context, therefore it is highly likely Kissinger has 
never seen them, nor does he perhaps have any knowledge of their existence. Ricardo Thomas was the first 
African-American White House photographer.
188 Ricardo Thomas, photographer. “K issinger’s Trip to Africa.” From the Gerald R. Ford Presidential 
Library, photograph taken in 1976. This man is unnamed in the photographic documentation, but appears to 
have been a high official in Nyerere's government.
189 This tale, which, again, is undoubtedly false based on photographs o f the event, is found on page 935 of 
Years o f  Renewal. Any attempt to determine the purpose o f the fabrication is obviously guesswork, but it 
seems to indicate a kind o f psychological gamesmanship Kissinger conducted: if he was personally less 
impressive than Nyerere, at least the nation he represented had a sophistication that could only be crudely 
imitated by N yerere’s people.
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* *
These lapses in memory, or intentional fabrications, are not mere trivialities that 
can be chalked up to the vagaries of time. They reveal something interesting about the 
psychology of Kissinger. The man prided himself on his mental acuity, and these 
anecdotes of foreign adventures are just the kind of thing Kissinger routinely brought out 
at parties to impress guests. Kissinger’s tale of personal embarrassment sitting next to the 
elegant Nyerere speaks to the fact that Kissinger was indeed impressed, perhaps even 
intimidated, by the Tanzanian leader. However, how can these moments where the 
“facts” according to Kissinger do not comply with recorded images of these events be 
understood? Do these inaccuracies or fabrications belie Kissinger’s other contentions 
about this trip to Africa specifically?
Few would contest the fact that Kissinger possessed genius-level political skills, 
and given the effort Kissinger has put into “correcting” the record of his time in 
government, his own writings on his career must be read with some suspicion. Kissinger 
must have been aware that including detail enhances the believability of a story. Using
190 Ricardo Thomas, photographer. “Kissinger’s Trip to Africa.” From the Gerald R. Ford Presidential 
Library, photograph taken in 1976.
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these vivid moments of personal observation to frame political discussions allowed 
Kissinger space to “own” the context surrounding important political discourse, and is 
meant to reveal his command of the past, especially when there are few present to contest 
him.191 The problem comes when these detailed recollections are proved false. If 
Kissinger is incorrect about a moment of personal anguish, why would he be significantly 
more accurate about the intricacies of multi-hour conversation with a leader he had never 
met before? Kissinger’s account, while overall worthwhile and certainly useful, must be 
examined with some suspicion in the light of this emerging documentation.
Whatever was behind the complex feelings Kissinger had for Nyerere, and his 
decision to obfuscate the record of their interactions, he obviously had a low opinion of 
Mobutu. Kissinger never mentions anything of Mobutu’s personal charisma, and viewed 
Zaire in instrumental terms, perceiving Mobutu as something of an American 
functionary, doing largely what he was told. Mobutu’s predilection for gauche opulence 
rubbed Kissinger the wrong way as well; Kissinger said his accommodations in Zaire
1 92“never managed to cross the line from the ostentatious to the attractive.” Nor was he 
wowed by Mobutu’s fleet of vehicles or private zoo, though he appeared impressed while 
touring it with Mobutu who proudly displayed his totemic animal: the leopard.
191 Julius Nyerere died in 1999, the year that Years o f  Renewal, from which this account is taken, was 
published.
192 Kissinger, Years o f  Renewal, 942.
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The unflattering feelings Kissinger had for Mobutu extended to his perception of 
Mobutu’s political policies as well. Where Nyerere was seen as a worthy opponent, who 
differed with Kissinger on an ideological level, Mobutu’s pragmatic sense was largely 
devoted to generating “the ostentation he so clearly enjoyed to establish himself an aura 
of overwhelming power and majesty.”194 Mobutu thus presented much less of a challenge 
politically and subsequently warranted less attention from Kissinger than other potential 
enemies did. By 1976 Mobutu had proved himself to be the ultimate ally of the United 
States in the region, and as early as the summer of 1975 the United States was planning 
interventions into Angola through Zaire, and was training U.S.-backed FNLA troops 
using “North Korean military instructors based in Zaire.”195
By the time Kissinger readied to leave Zaire he literally felt sick to his stomach. 
The likely culprit for the ailment was the “wild boar and manioc plants” he had dined on
i9j Ricardo Thomas, photographer. “K issinger’s Trip to Africa.” From the Gerald R. Ford Presidential 
Library, photograph taken in 1976.
194 Kissinger, Years o f  Renewal, 945.
195 Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography, 676.
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the previous evening.196 Perhaps another source of unease in the Secretary’s bowels was 
the intractability of the opposing parties in the Southern African context. On one side 
were the moral opponents to white minority rule, led by Julius Nyerere. On the other 
were the whites themselves. Somewhere in between stood proxies like Mobutu.
Indeed, some of the headaches faced by Kissinger on the Africa trip emanated 
from his attempts to work with all sides of the South African liberation issue. Nyerere 
repeatedly denounced the racist regimes in Southern Africa in speech and print. The 
South African whites told Kissinger in private that Nyerere brought Chinese operatives to 
Tanzania to “train terrorists” for action Rhodesia.197 Despite these conflicting pressures 
Kissinger was very willing to apply intense pressure to the white leaders of Southern 
Africa’s minority led governments. Ian Smith, the leader of Rhodesia, said that Kissinger 
was trying to “Get me to sign my suicide note,” by advocating for black majority rule in
1 Q&the nation. Kissinger’s gastronomic challenges passed and he went back to 
Washington, ready to push American involvement in Southern Africa to a degree never 
before considered.
As he left, the usefulness of the United States to Nyerere and Mobutu became 
clearer to each man. Kissinger felt that “Nyerere wanted to 'borrow [America’s] power,' 
as he expressed it to me some months later, to help bring majority rule to southern Africa 
and to expel the white minorities influence in the aftermath.... To Nyerere, the United
196 The Victoria Advocate (Victoria, Texas), "Stomach Ache Idles Kissinger," April 27, 1976, 12C sec.
197 MOC. June 23, 1976. With SA leaders. Page 7.
198 Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography, 690.
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States was a weapon to be employed to accelerate the liberation struggle.199 Nyerere was 
not alone in viewing American foreign policy in Africa in the late 1970s in militarized 
terms. Mobutu also saw the U.S. as a gateway to military power—correctly it turns out. 
Even Kissinger saw American diplomacy in Angola as carrying with it the heft of 
military power, through proxies, of course.
Ultimately Kissinger returned from Africa with the situation there almost exactly 
where it had been when he arrived on the continent. Black majority rule and white 
minority rule were not political ideologies which could be brought into compromise. The 
potential cataclysmic violence which could spring from power vacuums created by white 
flight from these nations was being displayed in Angola. Angola also represented a key 
region for Kissinger to demonstrate American muscularity in foreign policy through 
forces backed by the U.S.’s proxy in the region: Zaire. Despite Kissinger's repeated 
promises to support black majority rule, the final racist regime in the region, South 
Africa, did not collapse until 1994, almost twenty years after Kissinger’s continental 
jaunt. What were the real outcomes of the trip then?
In order to get at what Kissinger thought happened on his trip to Africa, it is 
useful to examine conversations Kissinger and Ford had about the situation in Southern 
Africa immediately after his trip. Here we can see the back room considerations and 
maneuvers Kissinger came away from the trip understanding, and the way the public 
message Kissinger and Ford presented regarding the situation there was modified from 
their private understandings of the context of Southern Africa. Kissinger saw Zaire as not 
only a military ally which could help bring about American policy goals in Angola, but as 
a potential model of American-African relations to the rest of the continent. In a meeting
199 Kissinger, Years o f  Renewal, 93 1.
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with Ford he said, “If we could make a couple of countries showcases, we would be 
doing great. It won't take all that much—$100 million for Zaire.”200 He also told Ford that 
“we do have to make a major effort in Zaire. Mobutu says he has to have tanks
90  1psychologically because Angola has them.” Clearly Kissinger, despite positive 
personal feelings about Nyerere, recognized the deep strategic importance of Zaire to 
U.S. designs in Southern Africa. It is also interesting that Kissinger and Mobutu 
discussed the psychological impact of U.S. support, and were, in some ways, recreating a 
mini-Cold War arms escalation between Mobutu's forces and the forces of the MPLA in 
Angola.
Despite these private conversations with Ford, Kissinger told a group of members 
of Congress two days later that “Tanzania is politically the most influential country in 
this region right now,” and that “Tanzania is the intellectual leader of Southern Africa 
and as
such is the key to the future of the area.”202 Further he said of Zaire that “its leaders are
203really not too interested in Southern African matters.” He knew this was not the case: 
Mobutu was continually asking the U.S. for greater military investment in forces based in 
Zaire who were making war in Angola, but beyond this, Zaire was interested in Southern 
African matters because the United States was. Days earlier Kissinger told Ford that 
Zaire was the political key to Angola.
200 MOC, May 10, 1976, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Ford. White House. From Ford Library. Page 1.
201 MOC, May 9, 1976, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Ford. White House. From Ford Library. Page 1.
202 Memoranda o f Conversation, May 12, 1976, Kissinger, Ford, Bipart Mem o f Congress. The Cabinet 
Room, White House. From Ford Library. Page 2.
203 Ibid.
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Obviously, Kissinger and Ford recognized that on a pragmatic level, Zaire was the 
essential nation in Africa for the United States to enact its policies. In public, however, 
Kissinger routinely praised Tanzania and Nyerere, clearly knowing that this was the best 
way to earn some points for liberation-minded Africans across the continent. The 
documentary evidence is, unfortunately, lacking on the inverse perspective: what was it 
that Nyerere and Mobutu felt about their foreign interlocutor? Nyerere wrote prolifically, 
but preferred the philosophical and political to the memoir. Mobutu, other than a concern 
with regime mythology rarely spoke or wrote on his own life, and kept his political 
dealings very close to the chest, as he must have to have remained an island of power in 
the maelstrom of Congo for so many years.
Conclusions
Examining the 1976 visit of Henry Kissinger to Africa, and the context 
surrounding it, reveals several important aspects of American foreign policy in Africa 
around the Cold War. First, it clearly shows that Africa was not a relevant concern of 
U.S. foreign policy prior to 1975. Other than manipulating Zairian politics to prevent the 
massive nation from joining the Soviet bloc, the U.S. had a hands off, disinterested 
approach to African affairs. Kissinger’s visit changed that. From 1976 on, especially 
through the Angolan conflict, the United States took an active role in exerting diplomatic 
power, and occasionally military force (as in Somalia), across Africa, and actively 
worked against those nations which the United States did not see as benefiting its 
strategic interests.
Second, Kissinger’s obfuscation of African realities connects well to the 
American tendency to patronize African politics. As recently as 1994 America threw up
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its hands and refused to become involved in the Rwandan genocide, claiming that the 
Hutu-Tutsi conflict was part of an ancient feud between the groups. This is roundly 
rejected by scholars as even the solid construction of these ethnic groups coincided with 
Belgian control of the states of Rwanda and Burundi in 1908.204
Kissinger’s unique mix of idealism and realism brought his, and subsequently 
America’s, gaze onto African affairs. The legacy of this attention is yet to be determined, 
but the impact of U.S. involvement in the Angolan Civil War, which was solidified on 
that trip, has dramatic and horrific consequences for thousands of people in Angola 
today.
Ultimately, a great deal was at stake for each of the major players in this 
Kissinger-Mobutu-Nyerere triad. Kissinger felt pressure to salvage something of the 
Nixon presidency, particularly with regard to foreign policy, through diplomatic and 
martial interventions in Southern Africa. Nyerere was positioning himself as Pan-African 
leader, and felt personal conviction about the necessity of majority-rule in Southern 
Africa, and especially about the moral failure of the apartheid South African state. 
Mobutu Sese Seko's motives were harder to scrutinize, but no doubt he sought to bolster 
his personal power by any means, and knew that a strategic partnership with the most 
powerful nation on earth was the best way to achieve this.
Less than three years after Nixon boarded the Navy One in disgrace, Kissinger 
was exiting the White House as well. Jimmy Carter won the presidency, and Kissinger's 
time in appointed office came to a close. His policy in Angola was roundly criticized.203
204 For much more on this, see Philip G ourevitch’s We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed 
with our families: Stories from Rwanda  (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998).
203 An example would be John A. Marcum, "Lessons o f Angola," Foreign Affairs 54, no. 3 (1976). Despite 
its moderate tone, Marcum makes clear that Angola was a major mistake, and blighted K issinger's legacy.
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America had not yet failed in Angola—which it ultimately would—but neither was Angola 
a validation of the Nixon/Kissinger foreign policy strategy.
Even as Kissinger packed up his things in the White House, Julius Nyerere and 
Mobutu Sese Seko were still only mid-way through their periods of power. Mobutu's 
"Presidency" collapsed under violent rebellion in 1997, as retaliatory Rwandan Tutsi's 
took over his deeply weakened Zaire. Mobutu had been a staunch supporter of the Hutu 
regime that ultimately committed the 1994 genocide.
Julius Nyerere became one of the few from among the first generation of African 
leaders to step down from office peacefully. His grand vision of ujamaa had failed in 
spectacular fashion, and Tanzania was worse off economically when he left office in 
1985 then when he took the presidency in late 1961.206
In the final analysis it is clear that Henry Kissinger played a large role in making 
Africa a critical domain of U.S. foreign policy. The case of Angola proved to be beyond 
his considerable diplomatic and martial foresight, but the continent itself, as it was 
coming into its own as a collection of sovereign states, benefited in key ways from being 
taken seriously by the foremost diplomat of the modem era. Kissinger's respect for 
Africa's leading intellectual, Julius Nyerere, proved to be visionary, and while the 
dynamics of power between the United States and the African states are still be 
negotiated, Henry Kissinger fateful trip to the continent in 1976 was a watershed moment 
in this complex and vitally important relationship.
This thesis is not about Henry Kissinger. Kissinger proves useful, however, as a 
lens to examine the leaders of these nations through the eyes of America. The African
">06 Nyerere remained the head of the ruling party, Chama cha Map'mdiizi until 1990.
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context of the mid-1970s cannot be studied without examining the impact of the bi-polar 
Cold War on the continent. Congo in particular directly experienced the effects of an 
American interventionist policy in Africa at that time as their elected leader fell in part 
due to American machinations. Kissinger's utility to this thesis, then, is to challenge 
American assumptions about these men: a challenge which belies over simple 
conceptualizations of the men which continue to persist. Kissinger's own recollections, 
challenged in this section, can be seen as proxy for the flattening and misremembering of 
America's role in Africa, and to some degree the irrelevancy, in the long term, of America 
to the policies of these African leaders. Both Nyerere and Mobutu influenced, 
manipulated and perhaps politically bested one of the great diplomats of America's 
twentieth century, and thus Kissinger's brief but complex experience of these two men 
and their nations, provides a window into how these men functioned in the international 
sphere, dealing with nations exponentially more wealthy and militarily mighty than their 
own.
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Conclusion
207The Congo River is the deepest river on the planet. At its deepest, 755 feet 
down, new species of marine life are being discovered. The Congo River has featured in 
numerous pieces of global disseminated art, perhaps most notably Joseph Conrad’s Heart 
o f Darkness, and the John Huston directed Katherine Hepburn and Humphrey Bogart 
film The African Queen. The impenetrability of the Congo Rainforest, the largest outside 
the Amazon, feeds into the trope that the river winds its way into literal and metaphorical 
darkness—the impenetrable fortress of evil and wildness in the human heart. Particularly 
in English language sources, this trope is largely intact with regard to Mobutu Sese Seko. 
Written off as a troublesome dictator, Mobutu’s genuine political power and regional 
influence has been ignored. French-language scholars, on the other hand, have written 
many worthy works on Mobutu, such as Le Dinosaure— le Zaire de Mobutu and even the
9 208apologetic Mobutu—Dignite pour I ’Afrique.
The darkness, deepness and impenetrability of the Congo could not be more 
different than the character of Lake Victoria, a food source for millions, and the ever 
reliable source of perhaps the world’s most important river. Nyerere, like the lake that 
sheltered his home town, was deliberate, knowable and constant. He published 
prolifically on his own political ideas and thoughts. He gained tremendous global respect 
during his presidency, even to the point of being “one of the most prominent socialist in
207 Kyle Dickman, "Evolution in the Deepest River in the World | Science & Nature | Smithsonian 
Magazine," History, Travel, Arts, Science, People, Places | Smithsonian Magazine, 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/Evolution-in-the-Deepest-River-in-the-W orldJitml 
(accessed June 03, 2010).
20X Michela Wrong pointed me in this direction in the afterword to her book (327). She includes a number 
of other excellent French-language texts on the man as well.
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the world and one of the most articulate spokesmen of the poor and oppressed.”209 He 
defended well his own legacy saying, “we took over a country with 85 per cent of its 
adult population illiterate. The British ruled us for 43 years. When they left, there were 2 
trained engineers and 12 doctors. This is the country we inherited. When I stepped down
there was 91-per-cent literacy and nearly every child was in school. We trained thousands
210of engineers and doctors and teachers.”
In the end, despite what they achieved or did poorly, like the source of the Nile, 
and highlands where the Congo River emerges from the earth, the final product of each 
man had much to do with their origins. Mobutu would never have the opportunities for 
study and scholarships to go abroad that Nyerere was given. Because of its vastness and 
complex ethnic milieu Congo could never have engendered the peaceful transfer of 
power TANU achieved in Tanzania. The British, for all their faults, ruled Tanganyika in 
a way that at least gave Nyerere something to work with, in terms of administration as he 
set out to develop his nation into an Ujamaa paradise. Mobutu inherited a bloody, 
fragmented maelstrom. No other mechanism, other than the exertion of martial power, 
would have allowed him access to the highest office in the land, especially after the 
assignation of Lumumba, perhaps the only person who had the opportunity to take Congo 
on a path much more like Tanzania’s.
This is not intended to make a deterministic point about Nyerere’s relative 
triumphs as a leader versus Mobutu’s stream of vagaries and oppressions, but rather to 
suggest that ignoring the context of a situation when evaluating a leader diminishes the
209 Godfrey Mwakikagile, Tanzania under Mw a limit Nyerere: Reflections on an African Statesman (Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania: New Africa Press, 2006), 58.
210 Ikaweba Bunting, "The Heart o f Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere," The New Internationalist, 
January/February 1999.
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significance of how power reasonably could be achieved in a given context. Nyerere is 
Nyerere in no small part because of what Tanzania was, in addition to, of course, his own 
massive influence on the nation. Congo, too, must be seen as both a product, and source, 
of Mobutu Sese Seko. Men are made and make themselves, and much like the waters 
from which they emerged, their legacies will long outlive the men, continuing to 
influence and impact millions of lives today and into the unknowable future.
The Waters Run Down 
Like the waters of Africa, there was, and is, a cyclic nature to the production of 
the nation in the African context. Nyerere and Mobutu were shaped by their origins, and 
by the processes by which they gained power. Once in power, however, they shaped the 
nations they led. As a result the next generation of leader in the nation became a product 
of the national conditions which led to their rise, largely products of the two men in 
power.
It can be dangerous to draw to large a conclusion from a study with limited scope, 
but in the context of Tanzania and Congo, it seems fair to say that the nation which was 
the less successful colony in terms of economic exploitation fared much better politically 
and in terms of ethnic conflict than the one which still remains an object of much interest 
from multinational extractive corporations. Tanzania’s “failure” to prove viable in terms 
of commercial sisal agriculture or coffee production, other than in pockets of the country, 
meant that Britain had less to lose in allowing it independence, and largely staying out of 
its affairs as it gained independence. This opportunity was not afforded Congo, and the 
UN, the United States and Belgium all exerted dramatic, intense and continued pressure 
on the newly independent nation, most obviously in the assassination of its first elected
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president. This theory is well summarized in recent work by political scientist Elliot 
Green:
I argue that both high amounts of capital and labour and inter-regional imbalances
in labour, land and capital can contribute to political instability and conflict.
Conversely, low amounts of capital and labour, combined with an equitable
distribution of all three factor endowments, can encourage political stability and
211nation formation.
Contemporary analysts of Africa heap criticism on Mobutu for his obvious 
corruption and repressive instincts. While Mobutu is accused of emulating the corruption 
of his colonial forbearers, continued foreign involvement in the Congo adheres to the 
trajectory of economic exploitation which has permeated Congo’s 20th century. The 
reality of continued exploitation suggest Mobutu can be seen as a symptom of 
exploitation run amok rather than as the producer of it, per se.
Like water too, it can be difficult to grasp the nature of these complex and 
powerful men in a brief introductory study such as this. Even as one closes a hand around 
an aspect of these men's lives, the slippery nature of history, memory and political 
ideology force the realities of Africa's nation state-building projects and their leaders 
further from grasp. Future development of this research will centralize the response of 
Nyerere and Mobutu to Kissinger and other American representatives as source material 
becomes more available on the subject. Further versions will also move the narrative 
down to the ground level more often, to demonstrate what effect these men had to people 
on a day-to-day level, as access to local archives becomes more possible. Despite the 
limitations of this project, this study intends to provide a starting point in examining these
211 Elliot Green, "The Political Economy o f Nation Formation in Modern Tanzania," in Proceedings o f  the 
Annual Meeting o f  the American Political Science Association; Toronto, September 2009, proceedings of 
The Annual Meeting o f the American Political Science Association, University o f Toronto, 2.
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influential, important men, and the legacies they have left behind for their people and the 
people of Africa.
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